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Abstract
We consider two-sided matching problems where agents on one side
of the market (hospitals) are required to satisfy certain distributional
constraints. We show that when the preferences and constraints of
the hospitals can be represented by an M\-concave function, (i) the
generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism is strategyproof for
doctors, (ii) it produces the doctor-optimal stable matching, and (iii)
its time complexity is proportional to the square of the number of pos-
sible contracts. Furthermore, we provide sucient conditions under
which the generalized DA mechanism satises these desirable prop-
erties. These conditions are applicable to various existing works and
enable new applications as well, thereby providing a recipe for devel-
oping desirable mechanisms in practice.
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1 Introduction
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed, and it
has been applied to design clearinghouse mechanisms in various markets in
practice.1 As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of en-
vironments, however, researchers and practitioners have encountered various
forms of distributional constraints. As these features have been precluded
from consideration until recently, they pose new challenges for market de-
signers.
The regional maximum quotas provide an example of distributional con-
straints. Under the regional maximum quotas, each agent on one side of the
market (who we call a hospital) belongs to a region, and there is an upper
bound on the number of agents on the other side (who we call doctors) who
can be matched in each region. Regional maximum quotas exist in many
markets in practice. A case in point is medical residency matching in Japan.
Although the match organizers initially employed the standard Deferred Ac-
ceptance (DA) mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962), it was criticized as
placing too many doctors in urban areas and causing doctor shortages in
rural areas. To address this criticism, the Japanese government now imposes
a regional maximum quota on each region of the country. Regulations that
are mathematically isomorphic to regional maximum quotas are utilized in
various contexts, such as Chinese graduate admission, Ukrainian college ad-
mission, and Scottish probationary teacher matching, among others (Kamada
and Kojima, 2012, 2015).
Furthermore, there are many matching problems in which minimum quo-
tas are imposed. School districts may need at least a certain number of
students in each school in order for the school to operate, as in college ad-
missions in Hungary (Biro, Fleiner, Irving, and Manlove, 2010). The cadet-
branch matching program organized by United States Military Academy im-
poses minimum quotas on the number of cadets who must be assigned to
1See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive survey of many results in this
literature.
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each branch (Sonmez and Switzer, 2013). Yet another type of constraints
takes the form of diversity constraints. Public schools are often required to
satisfy balance between dierent types of students, typically in terms of so-
cioeconomic status (Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim, 2014). Several
mechanisms have been proposed for each of these various constraints, but
previous studies have focused on tailoring mechanisms to specic settings,
rather than providing a general framework.2
This paper develops a general framework for handling various distribu-
tional constraints in the setting of matching with contracts (Hateld and
Milgrom, 2005). We begin with a simple model in which, on one side of the
market, there exists just one hypothetical representative agent, the hospi-
tals. Although extremely simple, this model proves useful. More specically,
we oer methods to aggregate the preferences of individual hospitals and
distributional constraints into a preference of this representative agent and,
as detailed later, use this aggregation to help analyze matching with con-
straints.3
For this model with the hospitals, the crux of our analysis is to asso-
ciate the preference of the hospitals with a mathematical concept called
M\-concavity (Murota and Shioura, 1999).4 M\-concavity is an adaptation
of concavity to functions on discrete domains, and has been studied exten-
sively in discrete convex analysis, a branch of discrete mathematics. We
show that if the hospitals' aggregated preference can be represented by an
M\-concave function, then the following key properties in two-sided match-
2Examples of papers that accommodate specic constraints include Ehlers, Hafalir,
Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014); Fragiadakis, Iwasaki, Troyan, Ueda, and Yokoo (2016);
Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2016); Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki,
Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014); Kamada and Kojima (2015). Needless to say, we do not claim
to subsume all the results in the existing studies. For instance, Kamada and Kojima
(2014) allow for general choice functions that satisfy substitutability, while our study
focuses on choice functions that satisfy M\-concavity, which is a stronger requirement.
Another notable example is the study of matching with minimum quotas by Fragiadakis
and Troyan (2016). Their mechanisms are dierent from ours, and whether there is any
way to reduce their problem to our framework, or even any matching framework with
substitutability, is an open question.
3In fact, our results readily generalize for cases with multiple, separate hospitals each
of which satises M\-concavity. The assumption of exactly one agent on the hospital
side is made for simplicity only and, as stated above, that model proves sucient for our
purposes. A similar technique has been used by Kamada and Kojima (2014).
4The letter M in M\-concavity comes from \matroid," a mathematical structure that
plays an important role in this paper. The symbol \ is read \natural."
3
ing hold: (i) the generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism (Hateld
and Milgrom, 2005) is strategyproof for doctors, (ii) the resulting match-
ing is stable (in the sense of Hateld and Milgrom (2005)) and optimal for
each doctor among all stable matchings, and (iii) the time complexity of the
generalized DA mechanism is proportional to the square of the number of
possible contracts.
Equipped with this general result, we study conditions under which the
hospitals' preference can be represented by an M\-concave function. We start
by separating the preference of the hospitals into two parts. More specically,
we divide the preference of the hospitals into hard distributional constraints
for the contracts to be feasible, and soft preferences over a family of feasible
contracts. Drawing upon techniques from discrete convex analysis, we rst
show that if the hospitals' preference is represented by an M\-concave func-
tion, then a family of the sets of contracts that satisfy hard distributional
constraints (which we call hospital-feasible contracts) must constitute a ma-
troid. Next, we show that if the hard distributional constraints constitute a
matroid and the soft preferences satisfy certain easy-to-verify conditions (e.g.,
they can be represented as a sum of values associated with individual con-
tracts), then the hospitals' preference can be represented by an M\-concave
function; thus the generalized DA mechanism satises desirable properties.
One of the main motivations of our work is to provide an easy-to-use
recipe, or a toolkit, for organizing matching mechanisms under constraints.
Although our general result is stated in terms of the abstract M\-concavity
condition, market designers do not need advanced knowledge of discrete con-
vex analysis or matching theory. On the contrary, our sucient conditions
in the preceding sections suce for most practical applications. To use our
tool, all one needs to show is that the given hard distributional constraints
produce a matroid (as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, requirements
over soft preferences turn out to be elementary, e.g., the sum of the individ-
ual contract values). Fortunately, there exists a vast literature on matroid
theory, and what kinds of constraints produce a matroid is well-understood.
Therefore, it usually suces to show that the hard distributional constraints
can be mapped into existing results in matroid theory. We conrm this fact
by demonstrating that most distributional constraints can be represented
using our method. The list of applications includes matching markets with
regional maximum quotas (Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo,
2014; Kamada and Kojima, 2014, 2015, 2017), regional minimum quotas
(Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo, 2016), diversity re-
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quirements in school choice (Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim, 2014), the
student-project allocation problem (Abraham, Irving, and Manlove, 2007),
and the cadet-branch matching program (Sonmez and Switzer, 2013).5
We further demonstrate the applicability of our methodology by intro-
ducing a novel application. We examine a case in which constraints are
dened based on the distance from a given ideal distribution. To our knowl-
edge, no mechanism with desirable properties has been found in this setting
before, but our general methodology enables us to nd such a mechanism
straightforwardly.6 As such, we believe that this study contributes to the ad-
vance of practical market design (or \economic engineering") as emphasized
in the recent literature (see Roth (2002) and Milgrom (2009) for instance),
by providing tools for organizing matching clearinghouses in practice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in the rest of this
section, we discuss related literature. In Section 2, we introduce our model.
In Section 3, we prove that when the hospitals' preference is represented as
an M\-concave function, the above-mentioned key properties hold. In Sec-
tion 4, we present several sucient conditions under which the generalized
DA satises these key properties. Then, in Section 5, we examine an exist-
ing application (regional maximum quotas) and a new application (distance
constraints) on two-sided, many-to-one matching problems and show that
the sucient conditions described in the previous section hold in these cases.
Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper. Proofs are deferred to the appendix
unless noted otherwise.
Related literature
Although matching with constraints is a fairly new research topic, questions
related to this issue have been studied in the literature in various specic
contexts. In the U.K. medical match in the 20th century, some hospitals pre-
ferred to hire at most one female doctor (Roth, 1991). In school choice, many
schools are subject to diversity constraints in terms of socioeconomic sta-
tus and academic performance (Abdulkadiroglu, 2005; Abdulkadiroglu and
Sonmez, 2003; Echenique and Yenmez, 2015; Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and
5Most of these results are presented in the appendix.
6In the appendix, we examine another novel application. Specically, we study a setting
where hospitals are partitioned into regions, and each region is associated with a regional
maximum quota as well as a subset of doctors who have priority to be placed in that
region over other doctors.
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Yildirim, 2014; Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim, 2013; Kojima, 2012). Con-
straints placed over sets of agents have been studied in the context of student-
project allocations (Abraham, Irving, and Manlove, 2007), college admission
(Biro, Fleiner, Irving, and Manlove, 2010), and medical residency matching
(Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo, 2016; Goto, Iwasaki,
Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo, 2014; Kamada and Kojima, 2014, 2015, 2017).
Our marginal contribution over these existing studies is to present a unied
framework and analyze these specic markets as well as others using a single
technique: as will be seen below, our theory can be applied to a wide variety
of existing applications as well as new ones (Section 5).
Our paper is at the intersection of discrete mathematics and economics.
In the former research eld, there is a vast literature on discrete optimization.
Its insight has been used in a broad range of applications such as schedul-
ing, facility location, and structural analysis of engineering systems among
others: see Murota (2000) or Schrijver (2003) or Korte and Vygen (2012),
for instance. Recent advances in discrete convex analysis have found appli-
cations in exchange economies with indivisible goods (Murota, 2003; Murota
and Tamura, 2003; Sun and Yang, 2006), systems analysis (Murota, 2003),
inventory management (Huh and Janakiraman, 2010; Zipkin, 2008) and auc-
tion (Murota, Shioura, and Yang, 2013). As this long, and yet partial, list
suggests, techniques from this literature can be applied to a wide variety
of problems. We add matching problems to this list. As suggested by our
analysis, results from discrete convex analysis may provide useful tools for
studying matching specically as well as economics in general.
This paper is not the rst to apply discrete convex analysis to matching
problems. Fujishige and Tamura (2006, 2007) and Murota and Yokoi (2015)
apply discrete convex analysis to study matching problems, and some of our
analysis draws upon their results.7 8 Our marginal contributions are twofold.
First, while incentive issues are not a central topic in these existing studies,
they are one of the main issues in our analysis, i.e., we apply our technique to
show that the generalized DA mechanism is strategyproof for doctors. Such
a strategic question is a natural issue in economics, but it is rarely studied in
7More specically, these works deal with a many-to-many matching problem, in which
a doctor/worker can work at multiple hospitals/rms. Fujishige and Tamura (2006, 2007)
also consider continuous transfer and quasilinear payo functions.
8See also an earlier contribution by Fleiner (2001) who applies matroid theory to match-
ing. His analysis is a special case of a more recent contribution by Fujishige and Tamura
(2007).
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the optimization literature. In this sense, we provide new economic questions
to the discrete optimization literature. Second, we are the rst to establish
that various constraints found in practice can be addressed by the technique
of discrete convex analysis.
This paper uses the framework of matching with contracts due to Hat-
eld and Milgrom (2005).9 They identify a set of conditions for key results
in matching with contracts. More specically, if the choice function of ev-
ery hospital satises substitutability, the law of aggregate demand, and the
irrelevance of rejected contracts, then a generalized DA mechanism nds a
stable allocation, and the mechanism is strategyproof for doctors.10 Hateld
and Kojima (2009, 2010) further show that the generalized DA mechanism is
group strategyproof for doctors.11 Our analysis draws upon those studies, but
it makes at least three marginal contributions over them. First, we provide
three sucient conditions for the key results to hold, where the requirements
over soft preferences are elementary. Thus, basically all one needs to show
is that the given hard distributional constraints produce a matroid. Second,
there exists a vast literature on matroid theory, and what kinds of constraints
produce a matroid is well-understood. Therefore, it usually suces to show
that the hard distributional constraints can be mapped into existing results
in matroid theory. Lastly, the time complexity of the generalized DA mecha-
nism is polynomial under M\-concavity while this property is not guaranteed
under general substitutable preferences. This property is very important in
practical application.
As stated above, one of the main goals of our paper is to identify a class
of payo functions that is general enough to represent various distributional
constraints and preferences, while being tractable enough so that desirable
9Fleiner (2003) obtains some of the results including the existence of a stable allocation
in a framework that is more general than the model of Hateld and Milgrom (2005). On
the other hand, he does not show results regarding incentives, which are important for our
purposes.
10Hateld and Milgrom (2005) implicitly assume the irrelevance of rejected contracts
throughout their analysis. Aygun and Sonmez (2013) point this out and show that this
condition is important for the conclusions of Hateld and Milgrom (2005), while showing
that substitutability and the law of aggregate demand imply the irrelevance of rejected
contracts.
11Other contributions in matching with contracts include Hateld and Kojima (2008),
Hateld and Kominers (2009, 2012), Hateld, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky, and West-
kamp (2013), Echenique (2012), Sonmez (2013), Sonmez and Switzer (2013), and Kominers
and Sonmez (2016).
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normative properties can be established. Although this research program is
still in its infancy, there are notable contributions. Hateld and Milgrom
(2005) set the agenda by introducing a family of payo functions called en-
dowed assignment valuations. A variant of this class of functions is proposed
by Milgrom (2009) and further studied by Budish, Che, Kojima, and Mil-
grom (2013), while Ostrovsky and Paes Leme (2015) propose a new class of
payo functions called matroid-based valuations. We contribute to this line
of research in several ways. First, we identify a superclass of payo functions,
M\-concave functions, as the key to our approach.12 Second, in addition to
various sucient conditions, we identify a necessary condition for a payo
function to allow the use of our theory in terms of the matroid structure.
This paper is part of the literature on practical market design, both in
terms of content and in terms of approach. As advocated by Roth (2002),
recent market design theory has focused on solving practical problems by
providing detailed and concrete solutions.13 Real problems often share com-
mon basic features, but dier substantially in details. For instance, dier-
ent school districts share some common goals such as eciency, stability
(fairness) and incentive compatibility, but can dier in some details such as
diversity constraints, structure of school priorities, and authoritative power
of individual schools (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005, 2009; Ab-
dulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth, and Sonmez, 2005, 2006). In this respect, our
contributions are twofold. First, our framework provides mechanisms that
can be applied to a variety of existing problems as discussed earlier. Second,
we develop a theory of matching under constraints that could be applied to
new problems that have not been found yet but may be found in the future.
Finally, this paper is part of the literature on matching and market design.
The eld is too large to even casually summarize here. Instead, we refer inter-
ested readers to surveys by Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Roth (2008), Sonmez
and Unver (2011), Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2013), Pathak (2016), and
12Ostrovsky and Paes Leme (2015) demonstrate that the class of endowed assignment
valuations is a strict subset of the matroid-based valuations. The matroid-based valuations
is a subset of the class of valuations that satisfy the gross substitutes condition. The
gross substitutes condition is equivalent to M\-concavity (Fujishige and Yang, 2003). As
Ostrovsky and Paes Leme (2015) mention, it is still an open question whether the matroid-
based valuations is equivalent to the class of valuations that satisfy the gross substitutes
condition.
13Auction market design emphasizes the importance of addressing practical problems
as well (see Milgrom (2000, 2004) for instance).
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Kojima (2016).
2 Model
A market is a tuple (D;H;X; (d)d2D; f). D is a nite set of doctors and
H is a nite set of hospitals. X is a nite set of contracts. Each contract
x 2 X is bilateral, in the sense that x is associated with exactly one doctor
xD 2 D and exactly one hospital xH 2 H. Each contract can also contain
some terms of contracts such as working time and wages. Each d represents
the strict preference of each doctor d over acceptable contracts within Xd =
fx 2 X j xD = dg.14 We assume each contract x 2 X is acceptable for xH :
if a hospital considers a contract unacceptable, it is not included in X. For
notational simplicity, for X 0  X and x 2 X, we write X 0 + x and X 0   x
to represent X 0 [ fxg and X 0 n fxg, respectively. Also, when x = ;, X 0 + x
means nothing is added to X 0, and X 0   x means nothing is removed from
X 0.
We assume some distributional constraints are enforced on feasible con-
tracts. We assume such distributional constraints and hospital preferences
are aggregated into a preference of a representative agent, which we call \the
hospitals" (Section 5 and Appendix F illustrate in detail how such aggrega-
tions can be done in various applications). The preference of the hospitals
is represented by a payo function f : 2X ! R [ f 1g, where R is the
set of all real numbers. For two sets of contracts X 0; X 00  X, the hospitals
strictly prefer X 0 over X 00 if and only if f(X 0) > f(X 00) holds. If X 0  X
violates some distributional constraint, then f(X 0) =  1. We assume f is
normalized by f(;) = 0.15 Also, we assume f is unique-selecting, i.e., for all
X 0  X, j argmaxX00X0 f(X 00)j = 1 holds.16
14More precisely, we assume that for each doctor d, the set of acceptable contracts for
d is given as a subset of Xd, and d represents a strict preferences over that set. Clearly,
it is equivalent to a (more standard) model in which we let d be a strict preference over
Xd [ f;g where ; is the outside option, and say that a contract x is acceptable if x d ;.
15As described later, this assumption is slightly stronger than mere normalization, be-
cause it implies that ; is hospital-feasible.
16Observe that strict preference of the hospitals, a standard assumption in matching
theory, implies f is unique-selecting, but the converse does not hold. Also we note that if
f is not unique-selecting, we can obtain a unique-selecting function by modifying f very
slightly. Let us dene a total order relation onX, and for each x 2 X, let rank(x) represent
the position of x within X according to this relation, i.e., rank(x) = i if x is ranked i-th.
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Now, we introduce several concepts used in this paper.
Denition 1 (feasibility). For a subset of contracts X 0  X, we say X 0 is
hospital-feasible if f(X 0) 6=  1. We say X 0 is doctor-feasible if for all
d 2 D, either (i) X 0d = fxg and x is acceptable for d, or (ii) X 0d = ; holds,
where X 0d = fx 2 X 0 j xD = dg. We say X 0 is feasible if it is doctor- and
hospital-feasible. We call a feasible set of contracts a matching.
With a slight abuse of notation, for two sets of contracts X 0 and X 00, we
denote X 0d d X 00d if either (i) X 0d = fx0g, X 00d = fx00g, and x0 d x00 for some
x0; x00 2 Xd that are acceptable for d, or (ii) X 0d = fx0g for some x0 2 Xd that
is acceptable for d and X 00d = ;. Furthermore, we denote X 0d d X 00d if either
X 0d d X 00d or X 0d = X 00d . Also, we use notations like x d X 0d or X 0d d x,
where x is a contract and X 0 is a matching. Furthermore, for X 0d  Xd, we
say X 0d is acceptable for d if either (i) X
0
d = fxg and x is acceptable for d, or
(ii) X 0d = ; holds.
For each doctor d, its choice function Chd species her most preferred
contract within X 0  X, i.e., Chd(X 0) = fxg, where x is the most preferred
acceptable contract in X 0d if one exists, and Chd(X
0) = ; if no such contract
exists. Then, the choice function of all doctors ChD is dened as ChD(X
0) :=S
d2D Chd(X
0).
For the hospitals, their choice function ChH is dened by ChH(X
0) =
argmaxX00X0 f(X 00) for each X 0  X. Since we assume payo function f is
unique-selecting, ChH is uniquely determined by f .
Note that if X 0 contains multiple contracts that are related to the same
doctor d, ChH is allowed to choose them simultaneously.
Denition 2 (stability (Hateld and Milgrom, 2005)). We say a matching
X 0 is stable if X 0 = ChH(X 0) = ChD(X 0) and there exists no x 2 X n X 0
such that x 2 ChH(X 0 + x) and x 2 ChD(X 0 + x).17
We sometimes refer to the stability concept in Denition 2 as Hateld-
Milgrom (HM)-stability when we discuss the relation with other stability
concepts.
Also, let v(x) denote   2  rank(x), where  is a suciently small positive number. Then,
f(X 0)+
P
x2X0 v(x) is unique-selecting and argmax[f(X
0)+
P
x2X0 v(x)]  argmax f(X 0).
17Hateld and Milgrom (2005) as well as many others dene stability in such a way that
a block by a coalition that includes multiple doctors is allowed. Such a concept is identical
to our denition if the hospitals have substitutable preferences.
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Let X be the set of all stable matchings. We say X 0 2 X is the doctor-
optimal stable matching if X 0d d X 00d for all X 00 2 X and d 2 D.18
A mechanism ' is a function that takes a prole of preferences of doctors
D as an input and returns a matching X 0  X. Let Dnfdg denote a
prole of preferences of doctors except d, and (d;Dnfdg) denote a prole
of preferences of all doctors, where d's preference is d and the prole of
preferences of other doctors is Dnfdg. We say ' is strategyproof for
doctors if 'd((d;Dnfdg)) d 'd((0d;Dnfdg)) holds for all d, d, 0d, and
Dnfdg.
Let us introduce three properties of the choice function of the hospitals. If
ChH satises these conditions, the generalized DA satises several desirable
properties (Aygun and Sonmez, 2013; Hateld and Milgrom, 2005).
Irrelevance of rejected contracts: for any X 0  X and any x 2 X n X 0,
ChH(X
0) = ChH(X 0 + x) holds whenever x =2 ChH(X 0 + x).
Substitutability (the substitutes condition): for any X 0; X 00  X with X 0 
X 00, ReH(X 0)  ReH(X 00) holds, where ReH(Y ) = (Y n ChH(Y )).
Law of aggregate demand: for anyX 0; X 00  X withX 0  X 00, jChH(X 0)j 
jChH(X 00)j.
3 M\-concavity and the generalized DAmech-
anism
This section introduces the concept of M\-concavity, which imposes a re-
striction on the way that the hospitals evaluate sets of contracts. Then we
show that if the preference of the hospitals is represented as an M\-concave
function, then a number of key conclusions in matching theory hold.
Denition 3 (M\-concavity (Murota and Shioura, 1999)). We say that f is
M\-concave if for all Y; Z  X and y 2 Y nZ, there exists z 2 (Z nY )[f;g
such that f(Y ) + f(Z)  f(Y   y + z) + f(Z   z + y) holds.
18As in the case of the term stability, when we explicitly consider a set of matchings
that satisfy a particular stability concept, we abuse terminology slightly by, for instance,
writing \the doctor-optimal HM-stable matching."
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Figure 1: Concavity of a continuous-variable function
M\-concavity is a discrete analogue of concavity of continuous-variable
functions. To help develop intuition of M\-concavity, consider a continuous-
variable function g : R ! R. We say g is concave if for all y; z 2 R and 
such that 0    1, the following condition holds:
g(y) + g(z)  g(y + d) + g(z   d);
where d = (z   y).19 Assume y < z. Then, y + d is a point reached from
y by moving d to the right, and z   d is a point reached from z by moving
d to the left (Figure 1). In a discrete domain, we can interpret Y   y + z is
a point reached from Y by moving one-step closer to Z, and Z   z + y is a
point reached from Z by moving one-step closer to Y . Thus, M\-concavity
is a counterpart of concavity, adapted to make sense in the discrete domain.
In our context, M\-concavity is a requirement that contracts are substi-
tutable in a particular manner. To be more precise, we can immediately
derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume f is M\-concave. For any Y  X and z 2 X n Y ,
(i) ChH(Y + z) = ChH(Y ), or (ii) ChH(Y + z) = ChH(Y ) + z, or (iii)
ChH(Y + z) = ChH(Y )  y + z for some y 2 ChH(Y ) n ChH(Y + z).
Proof. Let Y  = ChH(Y ) and Z = ChH(Y + z). If z 62 Z, since Y  
Y and Z  Y  Z = Y + z hold and f is unique-selecting, Y  =
argmaxX00Y f(X 00) = Z holds. Thus, let us assume z 2 Z. Since f is
M\-concave, either (a) there exists y 2 Y  n Z such that f(Z) + f(Y ) 
f(Z z+y)+f(Y  y+z) holds, or (b) f(Z)+f(Y )  f(Z z)+f(Y +z)
holds. Assume (a) and Z 6= Y  y+z hold. Since Z = argmaxZ0Y+z f(Z 0),
19This denition is equivalent to the most common denition that g(y + (1   )z) 
g(y) + (1  )g(z) for all y; z 2 R and  with 0    1.
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Y    y + z  Y + z, and f is unique-selecting, f(Z) > f(Y    y + z)
holds. Also, since Y  = argmaxY 0Y f(Y 0) and Z   z + y  Y , f(Y ) >
f(Z   z + y) holds. Thus, f(Z) + f(Y ) > f(Z   z + y) + f(Y    y + z)
holds. This is a contradiction. Thus, if (a) holds, Z = Y    y + z, i.e.,
ChH(Y + z) = ChH(Y )   y + z, holds. Assume (b) and Z 6= Y  + z hold.
Since Z = argmaxZ0Y+z f(Z 0) and Y +z  Y +z, f(Z) > f(Y +z) holds.
Also, since Y  = argmaxY 0Y f(Y 0) and Z   z  Y , f(Y ) > f(Z   z)
holds. Thus, f(Z) + f(Y ) > f(Z   z) + f(Y  + z) holds. This is a con-
tradiction. Thus, if (b) holds, Z = Y + z, i.e., ChH(Y + z) = ChH(Y ) + z,
holds.
This proposition provides a specic sense in which contracts are viewed
as substitutable when the payo function is M\-concave. When a new con-
tract z becomes available, the new chosen set of contracts ChH(Y + z) is (i)
unchanged from the original chosen set ChH(Y ) or (ii) obtained by adding z
to ChH(Y ) or (iii) obtained by replacing exactly one contract y in ChH(Y )
with z. In particular, no contract that is not chosen from the original set is
chosen, that is, contracts are substitutable. Note also that at most one con-
tract becomes newly rejected, and that happens only when the new contract
is accepted. Therefore, from Proposition 1, we can immediately derive the
following properties.20
Corollary 1. If f is M\-concave, then ChH satises substitutability, the law
of aggregate demand, and the irrelevance of rejected contracts.
The converse of Corollary 1 does not hold in general. That is, there
exists a choice function ChH such that it satises irrelevance of rejected
contracts, substitutabiilty, and the law aggregate demand, but there exists
no M\-concave payo function which represents ChH . For example, let us
assume that the preference of H on X = fa; b; cg is
fb; cg H fa; bg H fa; cg H fag H fbg H fcg H ; H fa; b; cg;
and that, for each X 0  X, ChH(X 0) is dened as the most preferred subset
of X 0. It is easy to show that ChH satises irrelevance of rejected contracts,
20Fujishige and Tamura (2006) show that substitutability holds if f is M\-concave and
unique-selecting. Furthermore, Murota and Yokoi (2015) show that the law of aggregate
demand holds if f is M\-concave and unique-selecting.
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substitutability and law of aggregate demand. Suppose that ChH is described
by a payo function f . In this case, f must satisfy the following inequalities:
f(fb; cg) > f(fa; bg) > f(fa; cg) > f(fag) > f(fbg) > f(fcg) > f(;) = 0
and f(fa; b; cg) =  1. This function f is not M\-concave because for Y =
fb; cg, Z = fag and b 2 Y n Z, the following inequality must hold:
f(fb; cg) + f(fag) > max ff(fcg) + f(fa; bg); f(fa; cg) + f(fbg)g ;
which contradicts the denition of M\-concavity.
Actually, it is possible to characterize M\-concavity based on substi-
tutability (Farooq and Shioura, 2005; Farooq and Tamura, 2004). More
precisely, a function f : Zn ! R [ f 1g with a bounded eective do-
main is M\-concave if and only if for all linear functions p : Zn ! R,
f + p satises substitutability, where the eective domain of f is dened
by fx 2 Zn j f(x) 6=  1g. Furthermore, Fujishige and Yang (2003) show
that M\-concavity is equivalent to the gross substitutes condition due to
Kelso and Crawford (1982), as well as the single improvement property due
to Gul and Stacchetti (1999).
The generalized DA mechanism (Hateld and Milgrom, 2005) is a gen-
eralized version of the well-known deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and
Shapley, 1962), which is adapted for the `matching with contracts' model.21
Mechanism 1 (Generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism).
Apply the following stages from k = 1.
Stage k  1
Step 1 Each doctor oers her most preferred contract which has not been
rejected before Stage k. If no remaining contract is acceptable for d, d
does not make any oer. Let X 0 be the set of contracts that are oered
in this Step.
Step 2 The hospitals tentatively accept ChH(X
0) and reject all other con-
tracts in X 0.
21In Hateld and Milgrom (2005), this mechanism is called generalized Gale-Shapley
algorithm.
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Step 3 If all the contracts in X 0 are tentatively accepted in Step 2, then let
X 0 be the nal matching and terminate the mechanism. Otherwise, go
to Stage k + 1.
Now we are ready to show that the fact that f is M\-concave guarantees
that the generalized DA mechanism satises several desirable properties. The
following lemma immediately follows from existing results in discrete convex
analysis.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the preference of the hospitals can be represented
by an M\-concave function f . Then, the generalized DA mechanism is strat-
egyproof for doctors. Also, it always produces a stable matching, and the
obtained matching is the doctor-optimal stable matching.
Proof. By Corollary 1, if f is M\-concave, then ChH satises the irrelevance
of rejected contracts, substitutability, and the law of aggregate demand. Hat-
eld and Milgrom (2005) show that if ChH satises these three conditions,
then the generalized DA mechanism is strategyproof for doctors, and it ob-
tains the doctor-optimal stable matching.
This lemma shows that the generalized DA mechanism produces a desir-
able matching, and incentive compatibility for doctors are guaranteed. These
are the key properties emphasized in the theoretical matching literature (see
Hateld and Milgrom (2005) for example) as well as in the literature on prac-
tical market design (see, for instance, Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003) and
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2009)).
Next, we show that M\-concavity also guarantees ecient computation.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the preference of the hospitals can be represented
by an M\-concave function f . Then, the time complexity of the generalized
DA mechanism is proportional to jXj2.
Proof. At Step 1 in Mechanism 1, the calculation of ChD is O(jXj) in to-
tal, because each (rejected) doctor selects her most preferred contract which
has not been rejected. Hence the time complexity of the generalized DA
mechanism depends on calculations of ChH . At Step 2 in Mechanism 1, we
calculate ChH(X
0) by adding newly oered contracts one by one. More pre-
cisely, we use the next relation which is guaranteed by substitutability and
irrelevance of rejected contracts,
ChH(X
0) = ChH(ChH(  ChH(ChH(X 00 + y1) + y2) +    ) + yk)
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where X 00 and fy1; y2; : : : ; ykg are the tentatively accepted contracts at the
previous stage (or initially X 00 = ;) and the newly oered contracts in X 0
at Step 1, respectively. By Proposition 1 and the fact X 00 = ChH(X 00),
ChH(X
00 + y1) is determined by calculating f exactly jX 00j + 1 times, and
hence, at most jXj times.22 In the same way as above, we can determine
ChH(X
0) by calculating f at most k  jXj times. Since each contract is
selected as a newly oered contract at most once in the generalized DA
mechanism, the calculation of ChH is O(T (f)  jXj2) in total, where T (f)
denotes the time required to calculate f . Thus, the time complexity of the
generalized DA mechanism is O(T (f)  jXj2).
This theorem shows that the desired outcome can be easily computed by
the algorithm. This property is not guaranteed for the general substitutable
preference case. While sometimes de-emphasized in the literature, we em-
phasize that ecient computability is crucial for the actual implementation
of the mechanism in practical market design.
Overall, these results suggest that the generalized DA mechanism is a
compelling mechanism if preferences and constraints can be aggregated into
an M\-concave function. The remainder of this paper demonstrates that such
an aggregation is indeed possible in various applied environments.
4 Conditions for M\-concavity
In this section, we investigate conditions under which payo function f be-
comes M\-concave. Without loss of generality, we can assume payo function
f is represented by the summation of two parts, i.e., f(X 0) = bf(X 0)+ ef(X 0),
where bf represents hard distributional constraints for hospital-feasibility andef represents soft preferences over hospital-feasible contracts. More speci-
cally, bf(X 0) returns 0 if X 0 is hospital-feasible and  1 otherwise, whileef(X 0) returns a bounded non-negative value.
Let dom f = dom bf = fX 0 j X 0  X; bf(X 0) 6=  1g be the eective do-
main of f (or equivalently bf). In the present context, dom f represents the
family of hospital-feasible sets of contracts. In this section, we rst show a
22To be more precise, ChH(X
00 + y1) is either X 00, X 00 + y1, or X 00   x + y1, where
x 2 X 00. Thus, to obtain ChH(X 00 + y1), it is sucient to apply f to these jX 00j + 1
candidates and to choose the one that maximizes f , because f(X 00) has been calculated
at the previous stage.
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necessary condition on bf , namely, the eective domain of bf (or equivalently
f) must constitute a mathematical structure called matroid. Next, we iden-
tify three sucient conditions so that f becomes M\-concave, assuming the
eective domain of bf constitutes a matroid.
Let us rst introduce the concept of matroid (Oxley, 2011).
Denition 4 (matroid). LetX be a nite set, and F be a family of subsets of
X. We say a pair (X;F) is a matroid if it satises the following conditions.
1. ; 2 F .
2. If X 0 2 F and X 00  X 0, then X 00 2 F holds.
3. If X 0; X 00 2 F and jX 0j > jX 00j, then there exists x 2 X 0 nX 00 such that
X 00 + x 2 F .
The term \matroid" is created from \matrix" and \-oid", i.e., a matroid is
something similar to a matrix, and the concept of a matroid is an abstraction
of some properties of matrices. To get an idea, suppose that A is a matrix
and X is the set of column vectors of A. Let us assume F is a family of
subsets of X, such that for each X 0 2 F , all column vectors in X 0 are linearly
independent. It is clear that conditions 1 and 2 of the above denition hold.
Also, if X 0 has more elements than X 00, we can always choose x 2 X 0 n X 00
such that X 00+x becomes linearly independent. Therefore condition 3 is also
satised, which shows that (X;F) in this example is a matroid.
The concept of matroid has been utilized in matching theory. For exam-
ple, Roth, Sonmez, and Unver (2005) show that the sets of simultaneously
matchable patients induces a matroid. As we will see in this paper, matroids
play an essential role in our analysis of matching under constraints.
Now we are ready to present one of the connections between matroids
and our theory of matching with constraints. The following lemma holds.
Lemma 2. Under the assumption ; 2 dom bf , bf is M\-concave if and only if
(X; dom bf) is a matroid.23
Intuitively, if any of the matroid conditions is violated, we can create a
situation where bf(X 0) = bf(X 00) = 0, but either bf(X 0 x+y) or bf(X 00+x y)
becomes  1 for some X 0; X 00; x 2 X 0 nX 00, and y 2 X 00 nX 0 [ f;g.
23Murota and Shioura (1999) show that the eective domain dom f of an M\-concave
function f : Zn ! R [ f 1g forms a generalized polymatroid. The \only if" part of
Lemma 2 is a special case of this result.
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This lemma suggests that the matroid structure plays an important role
in our analysis. In particular, it is easy to see that the \only if" part implies
that a matroid structure is needed in order for the function f = bf + ef to be
M\concave. This means that, in order to utilize the theory of M\-concavity
in our analysis of matching with constraints, it is necessary for the sets of
hospital-feasible contracts to constitute a matroid.
Now that we have found the necessity of a matroid structure for our
analysis, let us turn to sucient conditions. More specically, we assume
that (X; dom f) = (X; dom bf) is a matroid and examine conditions on ef ,
i.e., the soft preference of the hospitals, for guaranteeing that f = bf + ef is
M\-concave. This task would have been easy if the sum of two M\-concave
functions were always M\-concave, since the hard constraint part bf is M\-
concave if dom bf is a matroid (Lemma 2). However, the following example
demonstrates that the sum of two M\-concave functions is not guaranteed to
be M\-concave.
Example 1. Assume X = fx1; x2; x3g. f1(X 0) is 0 if either X 0  fx1; x2g or
X 0  fx1; x3g, and otherwise,  1. f2(X 0) is 0 if eitherX 0  fx2; x3g orX 0 
fx1; x3g, and otherwise,  1. Since (X; dom f1) and (X; dom f2) are ma-
troids, both f1 and f2 are M
\-concave from Lemma 2. However, f = f1+f2 is
not M\-concave, since (X; dom f), where dom f = f;; fx1g; fx2g; fx3g; fx1; x3gg;
is not a matroid. To see this, observe that when X 0 = fx1; x3g; X 00 = fx2g,
we have X 0; X 00 2 dom f and jX 0j > jX 00j, but there exists no x 2 X 0 n X 00
such that X 00 + x 2 dom f holds (note that if f2 has some special form,
e.g., f2(X
0) is of the form
P
x2X0 v(x), we can guarantee that f = f1 + f2 is
M\-concave as long as f1 is M
\-concave, as shown in Condition 1).
The above example shows the mere fact that both bf and ef are M\-concave
is not sucient for guaranteeing M\-concavity of f = bf + ef . Nevertheless,
we demonstrate that a number of simple sucient conditions exist when
the hard constraint part induces a matroid. More specically, we assume
(X; dom bf) constitutes a matroid, and introduce three sucient conditions
to guarantee that f is M\-concave: (1) ef is a sum of contract values, (2) bf is
symmetric for groups G and ef is order-respecting for G, and (3) (X; dom bf)
is a structure called a laminar matroid on a laminar family and ef is a laminar
concave function on it. If one of these conditions hold, from Lemma 1 and
Theorem 1, we obtain: (i) the generalized DA mechanism is strategyproof
for doctors, (ii) it produces the doctor-optimal stable matching, and (iii) its
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time complexity is proportional to jXj2. As will be seen in Section 5 and
the appendix, most stability concepts in existing works can be understood
as stability with respect to one of these M\-concave functions.
Let us introduce the rst condition, which provides a simple but very
general method for obtaining an M\-concave function.
Denition 5 (sum of contract values). We say ef is a sum of contract
values if ef(X 0) =Px2X0 v(x), where v : X ! (0;1) is a function such that
x 6= x0 implies v(x) 6= v(x0).
As indicated by the name, function ef in this denition is written as a
sum of values of individual contracts, where v(x) is interpreted as the value
of contract x. Note that we assume each value is positive, and dierent
contracts are assigned dierent values.
Now we are ready to present our rst condition.
Condition 1. Assume (X; dom bf) is a matroid (or equivalently, bf is M\-
concave and ; 2 dom bf) and ef(X 0) is a sum of contract values, then f = bf+ ef
is M\-concave.
Proof. Let us assume ef(X 0) is represented as Px2X0 v(x). Since bf is M\-
concave, for any Z; Y 2 X, for any Y 2 Y nZ, there exists z 2 (Z nY )[f;g
such that f(Y )+f(Z)  f(Y  y+z)+f(Z z+y) holds. On the other hand,
we have
P
x2Y y+z v(x) +
P
x2Z z+y v(x) =
P
x2Y v(x) +
P
x2Z v(x). Thus,
f(Y ) + f(Z)  f(Y   y + z) + f(Z   z + y) holds, so f is M\-concave.
This class of functions is equivalent to the class of weighted matroids (Ed-
monds, 1971). Ostrovsky and Paes Leme (2015) show that a weighted ma-
troid satises the gross substitute condition.
The second sucient condition for M\-concavity is based on an idea of
grouping contracts. We begin by formally introducing the concept of a group
of contracts.
Denition 6 (group of contracts). Let G = fg1; : : : ; gng be a partition of
X, i.e., g \ g0 = ; for any g; g0 2 G with g 6= g0 and Sg2G g = X. We refer
to each element g of G as a group of contracts (or simply a group) in G,
and G as groups.
One division of contracts into groups that we use in this paper is based
on hospitals, that is, we let each gi represent the set of contracts related to
hospital hi.
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Kamada and Kojima (2014) introduce a concept called an order-respecting
preferences, which models a variety of preferences of the hospitals. Using the
concept of groups of contracts, we now introduce a class of payo functions
that represent this class of preferences.
Denition 7 (order-respecting payo function). For groups G, an order-
respecting payo function ef is given as follows:
ef(X 0) =X
g2G
Vg(jX 0 \ gj) +
X
x2X0
v(x);
where v : X ! (0;1) is a function such that x 6= x0 implies v(x) 6= v(x0),
and Vg : Z+ ! (0;1) is a concave function.
Now, we introduce a further condition on a matroid so that bf+ ef becomes
M\-concave, when ef is an order-respecting payo function.
Denition 8 (symmetry of groups). Let (X;F) be a matroid and G be a
partition of X. We say that G is symmetric in (X;F) if for all g 2 G, for
all x; x0 2 g, and for all X 0  X such that fx; x0g \ X 0 = ;, X 0 + x 2 F if
and only if X 0 + x0 2 F holds.
Now, we are ready to dene our second condition.
Condition 2. If (X; dom bf) is a matroid, G is symmetric in (X; dom bf), andef is an order-respecting payo function for G, then f = bf + ef is M\-concave.
Finally, we introduce the third sucient condition. The crucial concept
we use is the laminar family dened below.
Denition 9 (laminar family). T is a laminar family of subsets of X if
for any Y; Z 2 T , one of the following conditions holds:
1. Y \ Z = ;,
2. Y  Z, or
3. Z  Y .
We say f(X 0) =
P
T2T fT (jX 0 \ T j) is a laminar concave function if T is
a laminar family and each fT is a univariate concave function.
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In words, a family of sets T is said to be a laminar family if it has a
structure that can be described as layers or a hierarchy. More specically,
for any pair of sets in this family, either they are disjoint from each other or
one of them is a subset of the other. Laminar families have been used for
mechanism design in two-sided matching (Biro, Fleiner, Irving, and Manlove,
2010; Kamada and Kojima, 2014), indivisible object allocation (Budish, Che,
Kojima, and Milgrom, 2013), and auction (Milgrom, 2009).
A laminar family of subsets of contracts naturally induces a matroid, a
structure we call a laminar matroid, as dened below.
Denition 10 (laminar matroid). We say (X;F) is a laminar matroid on
a laminar family T if it is constructed as follows:
 For each T 2 T , a positive integer qT is given.
 F is dened as fX 0  X j jX 0 \ T j  qT (8T 2 T )g.
To show a laminar matroid is a matroid, let us introduce a simple matroid
and methods for creating new matroids. (X;F) is said to be a uniform
matroid if F = fX 0 j X 0  X; jX 0j  kg for some non-negative integer k.
For a set of matroids (X1;F1); : : : ; (Xk;Fk), where each Xi is disjoint,
their direct sum is dened as (X;F), where X = S1ikXi, F = fX 0 j
X 0 =
S
1ikX
0
i; where X
0
i 2 Fig. Assume (X;F) is a matroid and k is a
non-negative integer. Then, its k-truncation is dened as (X; ~F), where
~F = fX 0 2 F j jX 0j  kg.
It is obvious that conditions 1 and 2 of a matroid hold in the above three
cases. For a uniform matroid, if X 0; X 00 2 F and jX 0j > jX 00j hold, then for
any x 2 X 0 nX 00, it follows that jX 00 + xj  jX 0j  k, so X 00 + x 2 F holds.
Thus, a uniform matroid is a matroid. For a direct sum, if X 0; X 00 2 F and
jX 0j > jX 00j, then for some i, jX 0 \Xij > jX 00 \Xij holds. By this and the
assumption that (Xi;Fi) is a matroid, there exists x 2 (X 0 \Xi) n (X 00 \Xi)
such that (X 00 \Xi) + x 2 Fi holds. Therefore X 00 + x 2 F holds, showing
that a directed sum of matroids is a matroid. Finally, for k-truncation, if
X 0; X 00 2 ~F and jX 0j > jX 00j, then there always exists x 2 X 0 nX 00 such that
X 00+x 2 F , since X 0; X 00 2 F holds. Since we also have jX 00+xj  jX 0j  k,
it follows that X 00 + x 2 ~F . Thus, a k-truncation of a matroid is a matroid.
A laminar matroid is a matroid, since it is obtained from uniform matroids
by repeatedly taking directed sums and truncations. With this concept at
hand, we are ready to state the last sucient condition.
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Condition 3. Assume (X; dom bf) is a laminar matroid on a laminar family
T , and ef is a laminar concave function on T , then f = bf + ef is M\-concave.
5 Applications
As emphasized in Introduction, one of the main motivations of our work is to
provide an easy-to-use recipe, or a toolkit, for organizing matching mecha-
nisms under constraints. To demonstrate the eectiveness our recipe/toolkit,
we examine numerous applications of our method to two-sided, many-to-one
matching problems. Specically, this section presents one existing applica-
tion (regional maximum quotas) as well as one new application (distance
constraints), while relegating many others to the appendix.24 We show that
the sucient conditions described in Section 4 hold in these cases. For ex-
isting applications, these ndings allow us to reproduce key results and, for
some applications, show stronger results.
Before describing how to apply our framework to particular applications,
let us summarize our recipe. Consider a mechanism designer who is faced
with a matching problem with constraints, and imagine that she has some
initial ideas on what hard distributional constraints exist and what kind
of stability properties are desired. We suggest the mechanism designer to
perform the following two steps.
1. Check whether (X;F), where F is the family of hospital-feasible sets
of contracts, is a matroid. If not, modify distributional constraints so
that (X;F) becomes a matroid.
2. Compose ef , which reects stability, such that it satises one of the su-
cient conditions described in this paper. Modify the stability denition
as necessary, by adding more desirable properties, relaxing excessively
demanding requirements, or simply introducing tie-breaking.
24Specically, the appendix examines the following existing applications: the standard
model without distributional constraints (Gale and Shapley, 1962), matching markets with
regional minimum quotas (Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo, 2016),
diversity requirements in school choice (Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim, 2014), the
student-project allocation problem (Abraham, Irving, and Manlove, 2007), and the cadet-
branch matching problem(Sonmez and Switzer, 2013). It also studies a new application
where there are regional maximum quotas and regionally prioritized doctors.
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If these two steps are successful, the job of the mechanism designer is done,
because she can use an o-the-shelf mechanism, i.e., the generalized DA
mechanism. More specically, our analysis from the preceding sections guar-
antees that the generalized DA mechanism satises desirable properties. The
cases we discuss in this section illustrate how the above recipe works.
The advantages of using this recipe over using other general frameworks
(e.g., Hateld and Milgrom (2005), Hateld and Kojima (2009, 2010)) are as
follows. To use our recipe, basically all one needs to show is that the given
hard distributional constraints produce a matroid, since the requirements
over soft preferences are usually elementary as described in Conditions 1{3.
There exists a vast literature on matroid theory, and what kinds of constraints
produce a matroid is well-understood. Therefore, it usually suces to show
that the hard distributional constraints can be mapped into existing results
in matroid theory. Furthermore, by using our recipe, the time complexity of
the generalized DA mechanism is guaranteed to be polynomial.
5.1 Regional maximum quotas (Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki,
Yasuda, and Yokoo, 2014; Kamada and Kojima,
2015)
5.1.1 Model
A market is a tuple (D;H;X;R; (d)d2D; (h)h2H ; (qh)h2H ; (qr)r2R). D is a
nite set of doctors and H is a nite set of hospitals. X is a nite set of
contracts. A contract x 2 X is a pair (d; h), which represents a matching
between doctor d and hospital h. (d)d2D is a prole of doctors' preferences,
i.e., each d represents the strict preference of each doctor d over acceptable
contracts in Xd = f(d; h) 2 X j h 2 Hg. (h)h2H is a prole of hospitals'
preferences, i.e., each h represents the preference of each hospital h over the
contracts that are related to it. (qh)h2H is a prole of hospitals' maximum
quotas, i.e., each qh represents the maximum quota of hospital h. We assume
hospitals are grouped into regions R = fr1; : : : ; rng, where each region r is a
subset of hospitals. (qr)r2R is a prole of regional maximum quotas, i.e., each
qr represents the regional maximum quota of r. We assume each hospital h
is included in exactly one region, that is, regions partition H.25
25Kamada and Kojima (2014) consider a more general case where regions are hierar-
chical. We can generalize our results to such a case by utilizing the fact that contracts
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5.1.2 Feasibility
For each r 2 R, let X 0r denote
S
h2rX
0
h. We say X
0 is hospital-feasible if
jX 0hj  qh for all h 2 H, and jX 0rj  qr for all r 2 R. We say X 0  X is
doctor-feasible if X 0d is acceptable for all d. Then, we say X
0 is feasible if it
is doctor- and hospital-feasible.
5.1.3 Stability
First, let us dene the concept of a blocking pair.
Denition 11. For a matching X 0, we say (d; h) 2 X n X 0 is a blocking
pair if (i) (d; h) is acceptable for d and (d; h) d X 0d, and (ii) either jX 0hj < qh
or there exists (d0; h) 2 X 0 such that (d; h) h (d0; h).26
We say a matching X 0 is strongly stable (Kamada and Kojima, 2017)
if the following condition holds: if (d; h), where h 2 r, is a blocking pair
(Denition 11) then (i) jX 0rj = qr, (ii) (d0; h) h (d; h) for all (d0; h) 2 X 0h,
and (iii) if (d; h0) 2 X 0, then h0 62 r. In words, a matching is strongly stable if
satisfying the desire of a blocking pair by matching them results in a violation
of a regional maximum quota. To be more precise, assume (d; h) is a blocking
pair. Then, if (d; h0) 2 X 0, then h0 62 r (condition (iii)). Moreover, moving d
to h necessarily involves lling a vacant seat at h because no existing doctor
at h is less preferred to d (condition (ii)). Thus, if we move d to h from
her current match (which can be h0 or the option of being unmatched), the
regional maximum quota of r is violated since jX 0rj is already qr (condition
(i)).
A strongly stable matching does not necessarily exist (Kamada and Ko-
jima, 2017). Thus, we need to consider a weaker denition of stability in
order to guarantee the existence. Kamada and Kojima (2015) introduce a
weaker stability concept, which we call Kamada-Kojima (KK)-stability. We
say a matching X 0 is KK-stable if the following condition holds: if (d; h),
where h 2 r, is a blocking pair then (i) jX 0rj = qr, (ii) (d0; h) h (d; h) for all
(d0; h) 2 X 0h, and (iii) if (d; h0) 2 X 0, then either h0 62 r or jX 0h0 j   jX 0hj  1.
The second part of condition (iii) accounts for the dierence between KK-
stability and strong stability; (d; h) is not regarded as a legitimate blocking
related to each region form a laminar family.
26Note that we denote X 0d d X 00d if either (i) X 0d = fx0g, X 00d = fx00g, and x0 d x00 for
some x0; x00 2 Xd that are acceptable for d, or (ii) X 0d = fx0g for some x0 2 Xd that is
acceptable for d and X 00d = ;.
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pair if h and h0 are in the same region and moving d from h0 to h does not
strictly decrease the imbalance of doctors between these hospitals.
Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014) assume there exists a
total preference ordering H over X, i.e., x1 H x2 H x3 H : : :. Here, we
assume H respects each h, i.e., if (d; h) h (d0; h), then (d; h) H (d0; h)
holds. Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014) introduce a
weaker stability concept than strong stability based on this ordering, which
we call contract-order-stability.27 We say a matching X 0 is contract-order-
stable (Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo, 2014) if the following
condition holds: if (d; h), where h 2 r, is a blocking pair then (i) jX 0rj = qr
and (ii) (d0; h0) H (d; h) for all h0 2 r and (d0; h0) 2 X 0h0 . We note that the
condition (ii) includes the cases where d0 = d or h0 = h. When d = d0, the
condition (ii) means that (d; h) is not regarded as a legitimate blocking pair
when the hospitals prefer (d; h0) to (d; h).
5.1.4 Mechanism
Fix a round-robin ordering among hospitals; without loss of generality, de-
note it as h1; h2; : : : hjHj. Kamada and Kojima (2015) present a mechanism
called the Flexible Deferred Acceptance (FDA) mechanism, which utilizes
this ordering. Roughly speaking, the FDA mechanism allows each hospital
to sequentially accept one contract at a time according to the given round-
robin ordering, subject to regional maximum quotas. Formally, the FDA
mechanism is dened as follows.28
Mechanism 2 (FDA).
Apply the following stages from k = 1.
Stage k  1
Step 1 Each doctor applies to her most preferred hospital by which she has
not been rejected before Stage k. If no remaining hospital is acceptable
for d, d does not apply to any hospital. Reset X 0 as ;.
27A contract-order stable matching is identical to a regionally fair and regionally non-
wasteful matching dened in Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014).
28To be more precise, Kamada and Kojima (2015) allow a target capacity for each
hospital such that each hospital gets priority in accepting doctors up to its target capacity.
For simplicity, here we consider a case where these target capacities are identical for all
hospitals that belong to the same region, but allowing for more general target capacities
is straightforward.
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Step 2 For each r, iterate the following procedure until all doctors applying
to hospitals in r are either tentatively accepted or rejected:
1. Choose the hospital with the smallest index in the region rst, the
hospital with the second-smallest index second, and so forth and,
after the last hospital, go back to the rst hospital.
2. Choose doctor d who is applying to h and is not tentatively ac-
cepted or rejected yet, and is the most preferred according to h
among the current applicants. If there exists no such doctor, then
go to the procedure for the next hospital.
3. If jX 0hj < qh and jX 0rj < qr, d is tentatively accepted by h and (d; h)
is added to X 0. Then go to the procedure for the next hospital.
4. Otherwise, d is rejected by h. Then go to the procedure for the
next hospital.
Step 3 If all the doctors are tentatively accepted in Step 2, then let X 0 be
the nal matching and terminate the mechanism. Otherwise, go to
Stage k + 1.
Kamada and Kojima (2015) show that the FDA mechanism is strate-
gyproof for doctors and obtains a KK-stable matching.
Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014) introduce a dierent
mechanism, called Priority-List based Deferred Acceptance (PLDA) mecha-
nism, which utilizes the total preference ordering H . Formally, the PLDA
mechanism is dened as follows.
Mechanism 3 (PLDA).
Apply the following stages from k = 1.
Stage k  1
Step 1 Each doctor applies to her most preferred hospital by which she has
not been rejected before Stage k. If no remaining hospital is acceptable
for d, d does not apply to any hospital. Reset X 0 as ;.
Step 2 For each r, iterate the following procedure until all doctors applying
to hospitals in r are either tentatively accepted or rejected:
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1. Choose (d; h), where d is applying to h, d is not tentatively ac-
cepted or rejected yet, and (d; h) has the highest priority according
to H among the current applicants to hospitals in r.
2. If jX 0hj < qh and jX 0rj < qr, d is tentatively accepted by h and
(d; h) is added to X 0. Then go to the procedure for the next pair.
3. Otherwise, d is rejected by h. Then go to the procedure for the
next pair.
Step 3 If all the doctors who make applications in this stage are tentatively
accepted in Step 2, then let X 0 be the nal matching and terminate
the mechanism. Otherwise, go to Stage k + 1.
Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014) show that the PLDA
mechanism is strategyproof for doctors and obtains a contract-order-stable
matching.
5.1.5 Representation in our model
Let us dene bf(X 0) as 0 if X 0 is hospital-feasible, i.e., jX 0hj  qh for all h and
jX 0rj  qr for all r, and otherwise,  1. Then, (X; dom bf) is a laminar ma-
troid, since T = fXr1 ; Xr2 ; : : : ; Xrn ; Xh1 ; Xh2 ; : : : ; XhjHjg is a laminar family
of X.
First, we study KK-stability. As in Kamada and Kojima (2015), x a
round-robin ordering over hospitals, h1; h2; : : : ; hjHj. Let vhi(j) denote the
value associated with the j-th choice of hospital hi. Then, dene vhi(j) as
C(C jHjj i) where C is a large positive constant. Let Vh(k) :=
Pk
j=1 vh(j).
It is clear that Vh is concave. Then, dene ef(X 0) as follows:
ef(X 0) =X
h2H
Vh(jX 0hj) +
X
x2X0
v(x); (1)
where v() is a function representing contract values as in Denition 5, and
C  v(x) for all x 2 X. By choosing G as fXh1 ; Xh2 ; : : : ; XhjHjg, it is
clear that G is symmetric in (X; dom bf) and ef dened by equation (1) is an
order-respecting payo function for G. Thus, we can apply Condition 2.
The FDA mechanism is identical to the generalized DA mechanism where
ChH is dened as the maximizer of function f dened above.
The following proposition holds.
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Proposition 2. HM-stability (based on ef in equation (1)) implies KK-stability.
Proof. To show that HM-stability implies KK-stability, assume X 0 is not
KK-stable, i.e., there exists a blocking pair (d; h), where h 2 r and (i)
jX 0rj < qr, or (ii) there exists (d0; h) 2 X 0h such that (d; h) h (d0; h)
holds, or (iii) there exists (d; h0) 2 X 0, where h0 2 r and jX 0h0j   jX 0hj > 1
holds. In any of these cases, clearly (d; h) 2 ChD(X 0 + (d; h)). In case
(i), obviously (d; h) 2 argmaxX00X0+(d;h) f(X 00) because adding (d; h) to X 0
does not violate the regional maximum quota for f . In case (ii), (d; h) 2
argmaxX00X0+(d;h) f(X 00) because adding (d; h) and subtracting (d0; h) 2 X 0h
such that (d; h) h (d0; h) from X 0, the resulting matching does not violate
the regional maximum quota for r. In case (iii), by the construction of f ,
(d; h) 2 argmaxX00X0+(d;h) f(X 00). Thus, for each of the cases (i){(iii), it
follows that (d; h) 2 ChH(X 0 + (d; h)), which implies X 0 is not HM-stable.
Thus, HM-stability implies KK-stability.
We note that KK-stability does not imply HM-stability. To see this, let
us consider the following case. There are two hospitals h1 and h2, both of
them belong to region r, and qr = 1. There are two doctors d1 and d2. We
assume h1 d1 h2, h2 d2 h1, d1 h1 d2, and d2 h2 d1 hold. The round-
robin ordering over hospitals is dened as h1; h2. X
0 = f(d2; h2)g is clearly
KK-stable, but it is not HM-stable since (d1; h1) 2 ChD(X 0 + (d1; h1)) and
(d1; h1) 2 ChH(X 0 + (d1; h1)) hold.
The FDA (and the generalized DA) mechanism is not guaranteed to ob-
tain the doctor-optimal KK-stable matching. In fact, there is a case where
the doctor-optimal KK-stable matching does not even exist. Note that the
main focus of Kamada and Kojima (2015) is two-sided matching such as la-
bor market matching, so optimality for one side of the market is not the main
requirement. Note also that, despite the fact that the FDA (and hence the
generalized DA) mechanism does not lead to doctor-optimality, the mecha-
nism is still strategyproof for doctors.
Alternatively, we can dene ef(X 0) as C1jX 0j Ph2H C2jX 0hj2+Ph2H Ch
jX 0hj+
P
x2X0 v(x), where C1  C2  Ch  v(x) for all h and x, and Ch1 
Ch2  : : :. This is a laminar concave function onX[fXr1 ; Xr2 ; : : : ; Xrn ; Xh1 ;
Xh2 ; : : : ; XhjHjg. Thus, we can apply Condition 3. It is clear that Proposi-
tion 2 still holds when ef is dened in this way.
Next, we study contract-order-stability. As in Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki,
Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014), let us assume there exists a total preference
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ordering H over X, i.e., x1 H x2 H x3 H : : :. Then assume a positive
value v(x) for each x is dened with the property that v(x) > v(x0) when
x H x0. Let us assume ef(X 0) is given as follows:
ef(X 0) = X
x2X0
v(x): (2)
Thus, we can apply Condition 1. The PLDA mechanism is identical to the
generalized DA mechanism where ChH is dened by the maximizer of this
function f .
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 3. HM-stability (based on ef in equation (2)) is equivalent to
contract-order-stability.
Proof. Assume X 0 is not contract-order-stable, i.e., there exists a blocking
pair (d; h), where h 2 r and either (i) jX 0rj < qr or (ii) there exists (d0; h0) 2 X 0
such that h0 2 r and (d; h) H (d0; h0) hold. In either case, (d; h) 2 ChD(X 0+
(d; h)) and (d; h) 2 ChH(X 0 + (d; h)) hold.
If X 0 is contract-order-stable, then the rst condition for HM-stability,
namely X 0 = ChH(X 0) = ChD(X 0), is obvious. Assume there exists (d; h) 2
X n X 0 such that (d; h) 2 ChD(X 0 + (d; h)) and (d; h) 2 ChH(X 0 + (d; h))
hold. Then, it is clear that (d; h) is a blocking pair, and either (i) jX 0rj < qr
or (ii) there exists (d0; h0) 2 X 0 such that h0 2 r and (d; h) H (d0; h0) hold.
Thus, X 0 is not contract-order-stable.
From Proposition 3, we can guarantee that the generalized DA mechanism
obtains the doctor-optimal contract-order-stable matching, so the generalized
DA mechanism and the PLDA mechanism obtain the same outcome. Note
that this fact can be derived without checking whether these two mechanisms
behave exactly in the same way.
5.2 Distance constraints
In this subsection, we investigate a new application domain, where hospital-
feasibility is dened based on the distance from an ideal distribution. For
example, assume jDj=jHj = k, and a set of contracts that allocates exactly k
doctors to each hospital is regarded as ideal, but for a set of contracts X 0, as
long as its distribution is close enough to this ideal distribution, then X 0 is
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regarded as hospital-feasible. We call such constraints distance constraints.
Although such a constraint seems to be natural, to our knowledge, distance
constraints have never been studied before.
The closest to our model is Echenique and Yenmez (2015) who analyze
a choice function of a school that chooses a subset of students that gives a
distribution of students of dierent types closest to a given ideal distribution.
Their model is dierent from ours in a number of ways, however. First, they
consider a choice function of a single school, whereas our model is concerned
about distributional constraints of multiple hospitals/schools. Second, the
metrics used in their paper and ours are dierent. Lastly, and perhaps most
importantly, Echenique and Yenmez (2015) provide a choice function that
minimizes the distance from an ideal point while our feasibility constraint
only requires the distance to be at most a given amount. Given these dif-
ferences, there is no logical relationship, and the connection appears to be
tangential at best. We show a more formal discussion on Echenique and Yen-
mez (2015) in the end of this subsection. Erdil and Kumano (2012) propose
a preference class of one school called substitutable priorities with ties and
show that a preference that is similar to Echenique and Yenmez (2015) can
be represented as an instance of this preference class. The preference of the
hospitals in our model is not an instance of this preference class, since the
former is concerned about distributional constraints over contracts, which
can be related to multiple hospitals.
5.2.1 Model and desirable properties
A market is a tuple (D;H;X; (d)d2D; (h)h2H ; (qh)h2H ; ; ; ). The deni-
tions of D;H;X, d;h, and (qh)h2H are identical to those in Section 5.1.
We assume each doctor can accept any hospital and each hospital can ac-
cept any doctor. Thus, X = D  H. For notation simplicity, let us denote
jHj = m and jDj = n, and M = f1; 2; : : : ;mg.  2 (Z+)m is a given vector,
which is interpreted as the ideal distribution of doctors across the hospitals.
We assume
P
i2M 

i = n and 

i  qhi holds for all i 2 M , i.e., the ideal
distribution satises maximum quotas.  : (Z+)m  (Z+)m ! R+ is a dis-
tance function, which returns the distance between two vectors. We consider
two representative distance functions: (i) the Manhattan distance (or L1 dis-
tance), which is dened as (; 0) =
P
i2M ji   0ij, and (ii) the Chebyshev
distance (or L1 distance), which is dened as (; 0) = maxi2M ji   0ij.
  0 represents the maximal allowed distance.
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For a set of contracts X 0, let (X 0) denote a vector of m non-negative
integers (jX 0h1j; jX 0h2 j; : : : ; jX 0hm j). Also, let h(X 0) denote jX 0hj. The value
(X 0) describes how doctors are distributed among hospitals at X 0.
We say X 0 is hospital-feasible if the following conditions hold:
(i) jX 0j = n,
(ii) jX 0hj  qh for all h 2 H, and
(iii) ((X 0); )  .
At a matching X 0, a doctor d where (d; h) 2 X 0 has a justied envy to-
wards another doctor d0 where (d0; h0) 2 X 0, if (d; h0) d (d; h) and (d; h0) h0
(d0; h0) hold. We say a matching is fair if no doctor has justied envy.
At a matching X 0, a doctor d where (d; h) 2 X 0 claims an empty seat
of h0 if the following conditions hold: (i) (d; h0) d (d; h), and (ii) X 00 =
X 0   (d; h) + (d; h0) is hospital-feasible. We say a matching is nonwasteful
if no doctor claims an empty seat.
In general, fairness and nonwastefulness are incompatible, i.e., there exists
a case where no matching is fair and nonwasteful. To see this point, let us
consider the following example. There are six doctors d1; : : : ; d6 and three
hospitals h1; h2, and h3, where qh = 3 for all h 2 H. The ideal distribution
is  = (2; 2; 2),  is the Manhattan distance, and  = 2.
The preferences of doctors are given as follows:
 (d1; h2) d1 (d1; h3) d1 (d1; h1),
 (d2; h3) d2 (d2; h2) d2 (d2; h1),
 (d3; h2) d3 (d3; h3) d3 (d3; h1),
 (d4; h2) d4 (d4; h3) d4 (d4; h1),
 (d5; h3) d5 (d5; h2) d5 (d5; h1),
 (d6; h3) d6 (d6; h2) d6 (d6; h1).
The preferences of hospitals are given as follows:
 (d1; h1) h1 (d2; h1) h1 (d3; h1) h1 (d4; h1) h1 (d5; h1) h1 (d6; h1),
 (d3; h2) h2 (d4; h2) h2 (d2; h2) h2 (d1; h2) h2 (d5; h2) h2 (d6; h2),
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 (d5; h3) h3 (d6; h3) h3 (d1; h3) h3 (d2; h3) h3 (d3; h3) h3 (d4; h3).
Assume X 0 is fair and nonwasteful. Since  = 2, at least one doctor must
be assigned to each hospital. Note that h1 is the least preferred hospital for
all doctors. Thus, only one doctor can be assigned to h1 because, otherwise,
any doctor assigned to h1 claims an empty seat of either h2 or h3. Then,
remaining ve doctors must be assigned to h2 and h3. Since the maximum
quota of each hospital is three, at least two doctors must be assigned to h2
and h3. Since (d3; h2) is the most preferred contract for both d3 and h2, it
must be included in X 0 (otherwise, d3 has justied envy). Also, (d5; h3) is
the most preferred contract for both d5 and h3, so it must be included in X
0.
Furthermore, since h2 accepts at least two doctors, (d4; h2) must be included
in X 0, since it is the most preferred contract for d4 and the second most
preferred contract for h2. Similarly, (d6; h3) must be included in X
0. Then,
either d1 or d2 must be assigned to h1. Assume d1 is assigned to h1. Then, X
0
must assign d2 to her most preferred hospital h3 because, otherwise, d2 will
claim an empty seat of h3. However, this implies that d1 has justied envy
towards d2, since (d1; h3) h3 (d2; h3) holds. Then, assume d2 is assigned
to h1. Then, X
0 must assign d1 to her most preferred hospital h2 because,
otherwise, d1 will claim an empty seat of h2. However, this implies that d2
has justied envy towards d1, since (d2; h2) h2 (d1; h2) holds.
Since fairness and nonwastefulness are incompatible in general, let us
introduce weaker requirements related to nonwastefulness.
As in Section 5.1, let us assume the hospitals have a strict preference
H over contracts X. We assume (d; h) h (d0; h) implies (d; h) H (d0; h),
i.e., H respects each h. Then, at a matching X 0, we say a doctor d
where (d; h) 2 X 0 strongly claims an empty seat of h0 based on a
contract order if the following conditions hold: (i) (d; h0) d (d; h), (ii)
X 00 = X 0   (d; h) + (d; h0) is hospital-feasible, and (iii) (d; h0) H (d; h). We
say a matching is weakly nonwasteful based on a contract order if no
doctor strongly claims an empty seat based on a contract order.
Similarly, at a matchingX 0, we say a doctor d where (d; h) 2 X 0 strongly
claims an empty seat of h0 based on hospital equality if the follow-
ing conditions hold: (i) (d; h0) d (d; h), (ii) X 00 = X 0   (d; h) + (d; h0) is
hospital-feasible, and (iii) jX 0hj   jX 0h0 j  2. We say a matching is weakly
nonwasteful based on hospital equality if no doctor strongly claims an
empty seat based on hospital equality.
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5.2.2 Representation in our model
It is clear that the family of all hospital-feasible contracts does not form a
matroid since ; is not hospital-feasible. Thus, let us introduce a weaker con-
dition than hospital-feasibility. We sayX 0 is semi-hospital-feasible if it is a
subset of (or equal to) a hospital-feasible matching. Then, it is clear that the
family of all semi-hospital-feasible contracts forms a matroid.29 The following
proposition enables us to apply our methodology for this environment.
Proposition 4. Let  be the Manhattan distance function or the Chebyshev
distance function, and F be the family of semi-hospital-feasible contracts.
Then (X;F) is a matroid.
Thanks to Proposition 4, we can use the o-the-shelf mechanism (i.e.,
the generalized DA) by appropriately designing f . Let us assume bf(X 0)
is 0 if X 0 2 F , and otherwise,  1. Also, let us dene contract values
v : X ! (0;1) where (d; h0) H (d; h) implies v((d; h0)) > v((d; h)).
We can obtain an appropriate f to apply Condition 1. Let us assumeef(X 0) is given as follows:
ef(X 0) = X
x2X0
v(x): (3)
Thus, we can apply Condition 1. It is clear that HM-stability (based on ef
in equation (3)) implies fairness as well as weak nonwastefulness based on a
contract order.
Furthermore, we can obtain another f to apply Condition 2. As in Sec-
tion 5.1, x a round-robin ordering over hospitals, h1; h2; : : : ; hm. Let vhi(j)
denote the value associated with the j-th choice of hospital hi. Then, de-
ne vhi(j) as C(C   jHj  j   i) where C is a large positive constant. Let
Vh(k) :=
Pk
j=1 vh(j). It is clear that Vh is concave. Then, dene
ef(X 0) as
follows: ef(X 0) =X
h2H
Vh(jX 0hj) +
X
x2X0
v(x); (4)
where C  v(x) for all x 2 X. By choosing G as fXh1 ; Xh2 ; : : : ; Xhmg, it
is clear that G is symmetric in (X; dom bf) and ef dened by equation (4) is
29Since we assume all hospitals/doctors are acceptable to each other, when we apply
the generalized DA, the obtained contracts are guaranteed to be hospital-feasible.
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an order-respecting payo function for G. Thus, we can apply Condition 2.
It is clear that HM-stability (based on ef in equation (4)) implies fairness as
well as weak nonwastefulness based on hospital equality.
In the model of Echenique and Yenmez (2015), the set of students is
partitioned into nite types T = ft1; : : : ; tkg, as in the model discussed in
Section 5.4. Each school c has its own ideal distribution of types  2 (Z+)k
such that
Pk
i=1 

i  qc where qc is the maximum quota of school c. For given
X 0, the choice function of school c rst chooses a feasible distribution ^ based
on X 0 that is closest to . More specically, let Z = f j  2 (Z+)k; 8i 2
f0; : : : ; kg; i  min(i ; jX 0c;ti j);
Pk
i=1 i  qcg, where X 0c;ti represents the set
of contracts in X 0 which are related to school c and type ti students. Then, ^
is given as argmin2Z (; ), where  can be any Lp distance function except
for p = 1 (i.e., the Chebyshev distance). Actually, given the restriction
that
Pk
i=1 

i  qc, ^ is simply given by ^i = min(i ; jX 0c;ti j) for all i 2f1; : : : ; kg, regardless of the denition of the distance function. Therefore,
this setting is isomorphic to the following model in which a school is divided
into t type-specic sub-schools. For each sub-school corresponding to type
ti, its maximum quota is 

i . There exist no distributional constraints over
these sub-schools. In contrast to theirs, our distance constraints only requires
the distance from the ideal point to be at most a given amount. Thus,
our constraint allows for some exibility in the sense that the chosen set
of contracts does not need to minimize the distance. Instead, the choice
depends on the soft preference subject to the constraint that its distance
from the ideal distribution is within the given bound.
6 Conclusion
This paper studied two-sided matching problems in which certain distribu-
tional constraints are imposed. We demonstrated that if the preference of the
hospitals can be represented by an M\-concave function, then the general-
ized DA mechanism is strategyproof for doctors and nds the doctor-optimal
stable matching. Building on this result, we derived sucient conditions un-
der which the generalized DA mechanism satises desirable properties, and
established that these sucient conditions are satised in various applied
settings. By utilizing these conditions, we obtained various results in the ex-
isting literature as well as new ones as corollaries of our results. Because our
sucient conditions are easy to verify in many cases, they provide a recipe
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for non-experts in matching theory or discrete convex analysis to develop
desirable mechanisms that handle distributional constraints.
Our aim was to demonstrate that this paper's methodology is exible
enough to address various types of constraints. For this purpose, we showed
that existing results in the literature can be derived with our methodology.
Furthermore, we exploited our methodology to establish new results. A re-
lated point is that all of our mechanisms are instances of the generalized DA
mechanism. This is a major advantage of our approach in that it allows a
policy maker to adopt a mechanism o the shelf rather than searching for an
entirely new solution from scratch. We envision that our approach will prove
useful when the match organizer is challenged by new kinds of constraints.
We veried this conjecture to a certain extent in Section 5. Further verifying
whether this conjecture is true and, if so, in what applications, is left for
future research.
While many application domains have matroid structures and are amenable
to our method, there are other important applications that are outside of the
scope of our present method. For example, Goto, Kojima, Kurata, Tamura,
and Yokoo (2017) introduce a problem called student-project-room assign-
ment problem. In this problem, students and a room must be assigned to
each project, and the maximum quota of a project is determined by the ca-
pacity of the room assigned to the project. Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and
Yildirim (2014) consider a controlled school choice problem with hard mini-
mum and maximum quotas, in which students are divided into several types,
and minimum/maximum quotas are imposed on the number of students for
each type. These distributional constraints do not have a matroid structure.
Goto, Kojima, Kurata, Tamura, and Yokoo (2017) develop a strategyproof
mechanism whose outcome is nonwasteful while satisfying such constraints.
Their mechanism, however, does not produce a fair outcome in the sense of
eliminating justied envy, one of the main desiderata achieved in the present
paper. A possible step in future research is to develop a strategyproof and
fair mechanism that can handle constraints beyond the matroid structure.
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Appendix
A Properties of matroids
We introduce three properties related to matroids that are used in our proofs.
Property 1 (simultaneous exchange property). Let (X;F) be a matroid.
Then for all Y; Z 2 F and y 2 Y n Z, there exists z 2 (Z n Y ) [ f;g such
that Y   y + z 2 F and Z   z + y 2 F hold.
Proof. Let B be the set of maximal elements in F with respect to set inclu-
sion. B is called the family of bases. For B, the following property holds:
For all Y^ ; Z^ 2 B and y 2 Y^ nZ^, there exists z 2 Z^ n Y^ such that Y^  y+z 2 B
and Z^   z + y 2 B hold. This property is known as the simultaneous ex-
change property for bases of matroids (see Theorem 39.12 of Schrijver (2003)
or Condition (B) on page 69 of Murota (2003) for its proof). For Y and Z
in F , let us choose Y^ ; Z^ 2 B such that Y^  Y and Z^  Z hold. For any
y 2 Y n Z, either y 2 Y n Z^ or y 2 Z^ holds.
1. If y 2 Y n Z^, y is also included in Y^ n Z^. Thus, from the simultaneous
exchange property for bases, there exists z 2 Z^nY^ such that Y^  y+z 2
B and Z^  z+ y 2 B holds. If z 2 Z, both Y   y+ z (which is a subset
of Y^  y+z) and Z z+y (which is a subset of Z^ z+y) are elements
in F . If z 2 Z^ n Z, both Y   y (which is a subset of Y^   y + z) and
Z + y (which is a subset of Z^   z + y) are elements in F . In either
case, we have established that there exists z 2 (Z n Y )[ f;g such that
Y   y + z 2 F and Z   z + y 2 F , as desired.
2. If y 2 Z^, both Y   y (which is a subset of Y^ ) and Z + y (which is a
subset of Z^) are elements in F . Thus the desired property holds with
respect to z = ;.
Property 2 (laminar concave function). Assume T is a laminar family of
subsets of X, and f(X 0) is given by a laminar concave function
P
T2T fT (jX 0\
T j). Then, f(X 0) is M\-concave.
This property is the M\-concave version of Note 6.11 of Murota (2003).
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Finally, we show a property that connects a network ow problem and a
matroid. Let (V;E; c; S; t) be a directed graph, where V is a set of vertexes
and E is a set of directed edges. Here, S  V is a set of start vertexes and
t 2 V n S is a unique terminal vertex. Let c 2 ZE represent the capacities
of each edge, i.e., c((u; v)) is the capacity of the directed edge from u to v,
where u; v 2 V and Z is the set of all integers.
A network ow is represented by  2 ZE. ((u; v)) is the ow for edge
(u; v) 2 E, i.e., the ow from u to v. For ow , (v) represents the bound-
ary at vertex v, which is dened as
P
(u;v)2E ((u; v))  
P
(v;u)2E ((v; u)),
i.e., the dierence between the inow to v and the outow from it.
We say a ow  is valid if for all e 2 E; (e)  c(e) holds, and there
exists S 0  S such that for all v 2 S 0; (v) =  1, (t) = jS 0j, and for all
v0 2 V n (S 0 [ ftg); (v0) = 0 hold. We say S 0 is the sources of .
The following property holds.
Property 3. Let (V;E; c; S; t) be a directed graph. Then (S;F), where F =
fS 0 j S 0  S; 9 2 ZE; such that  is a valid ow where S 0 is its sourcesg,
is a matroid.
Proof. This matroid is a variant of gammoids; see Oxley (2011) on gammoids.
This is also a special case with zero costs of the network ow problem dened
in Section 9.6 in Murota (2003). Theorem 9.26 in Murota (2003) shows that
a function f(S 0), which is dened as 0 if S 0 2 F , and  1 otherwise, is
M\-concave. Since ; 2 F , from Lemma 2, (S;F) is a matroid.
Here, we provide a more elementary proof. It suces to show the last
condition of matroids (the other conditions are obvious). Let S1; S2 2 F with
jS1j < jS2j. Let us add an articial source s and edges (s; v) of capacity 1 for
each vertex v in S1[S2 to a given directed graph. We denote the new directed
graph by N^ = (V [ fsg; E^; c^; s; t), where E^ = E [ f(s; v) j v 2 S1 [ S2g and
c^(u; v) is 1 if u = s and c(u; v) otherwise. For i = 1; 2, we can construct a
valid ow i in N^ such that i(s; v) = 1 for all v 2 Si, i(t) = jSij =  i(s)
and i(u) = 0 for u 6= s; t. By an optimality criterion of maximum ows in
networks (e.g., see Corollary 10.2a of Schrijver (2003)), a valid ow  2 ZE^
from s to t in N^ is maximum (i.e., maximizes (t) among valid ows from
s to t in N^) if there is no directed path from s to t in the auxiliary directed
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graph ~N = (V [ fsg; ~E; ~c; s; t), where
Ef = f(u; v) j (u; v) 2 E^; c(u; v) > (u; v)g;
Eb = f(v; u) j (u; v) 2 E^; (u; v) > 0g;
~E = Ef [ Eb;
~c(u; v) = c(u; v)  (u; v) ((u; v) 2 Ef );
~c(v; u) = (u; v) ((v; u) 2 Eb):
Since 1 is not maximum by 1(t) < 2(t), there is a directed path P from
s to t in ~N1 . By modifying 1 into 
0
1 by
01(u; v) =
8<:
1(u; v) + 1 ((u; v) 2 P \ Ef )
1(u; v)  1 ((v; u) 2 P \ Eb)
1(u; v) (otherwise);
we have 01(t) = (t) + 1. Furthermore, since there is no edge from s to S1
in ~N1 , P must pass through a vertex v in S2 n S1. We can construct a valid
ow in the original directed graph from 01 where S1+ v is its source, that is,
S1 + v is a member of F .
B Proof of Lemma 2
The \if" part is obtained immediately from Property 1. The proof of the
\only if" part is given as follows. Let us denote dom bf by F . The condition
; 2 F holds because of the hypothesis of this lemma. To show the second
condition of Denition 4, let us consider X 0 2 F nf;g and x 2 X 0. From the
M\-concavity of bf , we have
bf(X 0) + bf(;)  bf(X 0   x) + bf(fxg):
This inequality implies that X 0   x 2 F because bf(X 0) = bf(;) = 0 by
assumption, so the left hand side of the above inequality is 0, which holds
only if bf(X 0   x) = 0. By repeatedly using the above argument, any subset
of X 0 is also included in F .
To show the third condition of Denition 4, let us consider X 0; X 00 2 F
with jX 0j > jX 00j. It follows from jX 0j > jX 00j that there exists x 2 X 0 nX 00.
45
The M\-concavity of bf guarantees that (a) X 0   x;X 00 + x 2 F or (b) there
exists y 2 X 00 n X 0 such that X 0   x + y;X 00 + x   y 2 F because 0 =bf(X 0)+ bf(X 00)  bf(X 0 x)+ bf(X 00+x) or 0 = bf(X 0)+ bf(X 00)  bf(X 0 x+
y) + bf(X 00 + x  y) for some y 2 X 00 nX 0. In case (a), we have X 00 + x 2 F .
In case (b), let X^ 0 := X 0  x+ y 2 F . We note that jX^ 0j = jX 0j and X^ 0 nX 00
is a proper subset of X 0 nX 00. We replace X 0 by X^ 0, and continue the above
discussion. After a nite number of iterations, the above (a) must occur by
jX 0j > jX 00j. Hence the third condition in Denition 4 holds.
C Proof of Condition 2
It suces to show that the function f dened by f(X 0) = bf(X 0)+Pg2G Vg(jX 0\
gj) is M\-concave, because f is equal to the sum of f and a linear functionP
x2X0 v(x) (see the proof of Condition 1). Let Y; Z 2 dom bf and y 2 Y nZ.
We assume that y belongs to a group g 2 G.
For any z0 2 (ZnY )\g0 with jZ\g0j  jY \g0j and g0 6= g, by the symmetry
of G in (X; dom bf), there exists y0 2 (Y nZ)\g0 such that Z z0+y0 2 dom bf
and f(Z z0+y0) = f(Z). By repeatedly using the above argument, without
loss of generality, we can assume that Z satises Z \ g0  Y \ g0 whenever
jZ \ g0j  jY \ g0j and g0 6= g.
If jY \ gj  jZ \ gj then there exists z 2 g \ (Z n Y ). By the symmetry
of G in (X; dom bf), f(Y ) = f(Y   y + z) and f(Z) = f(Z   z + y), so the
desired inequality for M\-concavity holds with equality.
For the remainder of the proof, we suppose that jY \ gj > jZ \ gj. Since
(X; dom bf) is a matroid, Property 1 guarantees that either (i) Y   y; Z+ y 2
dom bf or (ii) there exists z 2 (Z nY ) such that Y   y+ z; Z+ z  y 2 dom bf .
In case (i), we have f(Y ) + f(Z)  f(Y   y) + f(Z + y), because
f(Y   y) + f(Z + y)

 

f(Y ) + f(Z)

=(Vg(jZ \ gj+ 1)  Vg(jZ \ gj))  (Vg(jY \ gj)  Vg(jY \ gj   1)) :
This value must be non-negative since Vg is concave and jZ \ gj < jY \ gj.
In case (ii), z must belong to a group g0 with jY \ g0j < jZ \ g0j and
f(Y ) + f(Z)  f(Y   y + z) + f(Z   z + y)
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holds, because
f(Y   y + z) + f(Z   z + y)

 

f(Y ) + f(Z)

=(Vg(jZ \ gj+ 1)  Vg(jZ \ gj))  (Vg(jY \ gj)  Vg(jY \ gj   1))
+ (Vg0(jY \ g0j+ 1)  Vg0(jY \ g0j))  (Vg0(jZ \ g0j)  Vg0(jZ \ g0j   1)) :
This value must be non-negative since Vg is concave, jZ \ gj < jY \ gj, and
jY \ g0j < jZ \ g0j. Hence f is M\-concave.
D Proof of Condition 3
Assume ef(X 0) is given asPT2T efT (jX 0\T j). Then, f = bf+ ef can be written
as
P
T2T fT (jX 0 \ T j), where fT (k) = bfT (k) if k  qT , and otherwise,  1.
This is also a laminar concave function, since each fT is a univariate concave
function. Thus, f is M\-concave from Property 2.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Let B be the set of maximal elements in F with respect to set inclusion, i.e.,
the set of all hospital-feasible contracts. To prove the claim, it is enough to
show that B satises the following property: For all Y; Z 2 B and y 2 Y nZ,
there exists z 2 Z n Y such that Y   y + z 2 B (e.g., see Theorem 39.6 of
Schrijver (2003)).
Let Y; Z 2 B, y 2 Y nZ and y 2 Yh for some hospital h 2 H. If jYhj  jZhj
then there exists z 2 Zh n Yh which also satises Y   y + z 2 B because
(Y ) = (Y   y + z). In the rest of the proof, we assume that jYhj > jZhj.
Since jY j = jZj, there exist a hospital h0 2 H and a contract z such that
jYh0j < jZh0 j and z 2 Zh0 n Yh0 . Let Y 0 = Y   y + z. Obviously, Y 0 satises
jY 0j = n and jY 0i j  qi for all i 2 H. If  is the Chebyshev distance function,
Y 0 is hospital-feasible because jh(Y 0)  hj  maxfjh(Y )  hj; jh(Z)  hjg
and jh0(Y 0)  h0 j  maxfjh0(Y )  h0 j; jh0(Z)  h0jg. For the remainder of
the proof, we assume  represents the Manhattan distance. If jYhj > h then
Y 0 is hospital-feasible because jh(Y 0)  hj = jh(Y )  hj 1. Let us assume
that h  jYhj > jZhj. If jYh0 j < h0 then Y 0 is hospital-feasible because
((Y 0); ) = ((Y ); ). We nally assume that for each i 2 H if jYij < jZij
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then i  jYij. By this assumption together with jY j = jZj =
P
i 

i , we have
fi : jYij < i g [ fhg  fi : jZij < i g and
((Y ); ) = 2
X
i:jYij<i
(i   jYij)  2
X
i:jYij<i
(i   jZij)
 2
X
i:jZij<i
(i   jZij) = ((Z); );
where the rst equality follows from the assumption jY j = Pi i , the rst
inequality results from the assumption that jYij  jZij for all i 2 H with
i > jYij, the second inequality follows from the relation fi : jYij < i g [
fhg  fi : jZij < i g, and the last equality results from the assumption that
jZj = Pi i . Also, note that at least one of the above inequalities holds
strictly. This implies ((Y 0); ) = ((Y ); )+2  ((Z); ), that is, the
hospital-feasibility of Y 0.
F Applications
In this section, we examine existing and new models of matching and show
that the sucient conditions described in Section 4 hold in these cases. For
existing applications, this connection allows us to reproduce key results and,
for some applications, show stronger results. This enables us to provide
mechanisms that are strategyproof for doctors and produce stable matchings.
F.1 Standard model (Gale and Shapley, 1962)
F.1.1 Model
A market is a tuple (D;H;X; (d)d2D; (h)h2H ; (qh)h2H). D is a nite set of
doctors and H is a nite set of hospitals. X is a nite set of contracts. A
contract x 2 X is a pair (d; h), which represents a matching between doctor
d and hospital h. (d)d2D is a prole of doctors' preferences, i.e., each d
represents the strict preference of each doctor d over acceptable contracts in
Xd = f(d; h) 2 X j h 2 Hg. (h)h2H is a prole of hospitals' preferences,
i.e., each h represents the preference of each hospital h over the contracts
that are related to it. (qh)h2H is a prole of hospitals' maximum quotas, i.e.,
each qh represents the maximum quota of hospital h.
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F.1.2 Feasibility
We say X 0  X is hospital-feasible if jX 0hj  qh for all h, where X 0h =
f(d; h) 2 X 0 j d 2 Dg. We say X 0  X is doctor-feasible if X 0d is acceptable
for all d (we say X 0d is acceptable for d if either (i) X
0
d = fxg and x is
acceptable for d, or (ii) X 0d = ; holds). We say X 0 is feasible if it is doctor-
and hospital-feasible.
F.1.3 Stability
Here, let us reprint the denition of a blocking pair in Section 5.1. For
a matching X 0, we say (d; h) 2 X n X 0 is a blocking pair if (i) (d; h) is
acceptable for d and (d; h) d X 0d, and (ii) either jX 0hj < qh or there exists
(d0; h) 2 X 0 such that (d; h) h (d0; h).
We say a matching X 0 is Gale-Shapley (GS)-stable if there exists no
blocking pair (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
F.1.4 Mechanism
The standard Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism (Gale and Shapley,
1962) is dened as follows.
Mechanism 4 (standard DA).
Apply the following stages from k = 1.
Stage k  1: Each doctor d applies to her most preferred hospital by which
she has not been rejected before Stage k (if no remaining hospital is
acceptable for d, d does not apply to any hospital). Each hospital h
tentatively accepts doctors applying to h up to qh according to h. The
rest of doctors are rejected. If no doctor is rejected by any hospital,
terminate the mechanism and return the current tentatively accepted
pairs as the nal matching. Otherwise, go to Stage k + 1.
The standard DA mechanism is strategyproof for doctors (Dubins and
Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) and obtains a GS-stable matching (Gale and
Shapley, 1962).
F.1.5 Representation in our model
Let us dene bf(X 0) as 0 if X 0 is hospital-feasible, i.e., jX 0hj  qh for all h, and
otherwise as 1. Then, (X; dom bf) is a laminar matroid, since fXh j h 2 Hg
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is a laminar family and we require jX 0 \Xhj  qh for each h.
Let us assume a positive value v(x) is dened for each x = (d; h) with
the property that v((d; h)) > v((d0; h)) when (d; h) h (d0; h) holds.30 Withef(X 0) = Px2X0 v(x), we can apply Condition 1. The standard DA mecha-
nism is identical to the generalized DA mechanism where ChH is dened as
the maximizer of function f dened above.
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 5. HM-stability is equivalent to GS-stability.
Proof. To show that HM-stability implies GS-stability, assume for contra-
diction that a feasible matching X 0 is not GS-stable. Then there exists
a blocking pair (d; h). Because (d; h) is acceptable for d and (d; h) d
X 0d, it immediately follows that (d; h) 2 ChD(X 0 + (d; h)) by denition
of ChD. Because either jX 0hj < qh or there exists (d0; h) 2 X 0 such that
(d; h) h (d0; h), by the denition of f , in either case it follows that (d; h) 2
argmaxX00X0+(d;h) f(X 00) = ChH(X 0 + (d; h)). Therefore X 0 is not HM-
stable.
To show that GS-stability implies HM-stability, assume for contradiction
that a feasible matching X 0 is not HM-stable. X 0 = ChD(X 0) because X 0
is a matching and hence doctor-feasible, and X 0 = ChH(X 0) because X 0 is
a matching and hence hospital-feasible, that is, jX 0hj  qh for all h in the
current model, and v((d; h)) > 0 for all (d; h) 2 X 0 by the denition of
v(). These facts and the assumption that X 0 is not HM-stable imply there
exists a doctor-hospital pair (d; h) such that (d; h) 2 ChH(X 0 + (d; h)) and
(d; h) 2 ChD(X 0 + (d; h)) hold. Then (d; h) d X 0d by the denition of ChD
and, by the denition of f , either jX 0hj < qh or there exists (d0; h) 2 X 0 such
that (d; h) h (d0; h). Therefore (d; h) is a blocking pair, showing that X 0 is
not GS-stable. Thus HM-stability is equivalent to GS-stability.
From Proposition 5, we can guarantee that the generalized DA mecha-
nism obtains the doctor-optimal GS-stable matching, so the generalized DA
mechanism and the standard DA mechanism obtain the same outcome. Note
that this fact can be derived without checking whether the two mechanisms
behave exactly in the same way.
30We note that although we assume a value v(x) is given for each contract and f is
dened by the sum of these values, ChH(X
0) is determined only by the relative ordering of
the values among the contracts that belong to the same hospital. Thus, the specic cardinal
choice of these values, or the relative ordering among contracts for dierent hospitals, is
not important.
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F.2 Regional minimum quotas (Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki,
Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo, 2016)
F.2.1 Model
A market is a tuple (D;H;X;R; (d)d2D; (h)h2H ; (qh)h2H ; (ph)h2H ; (pr)r2R).
As in the standard model, D is a nite set of doctors and H is a nite set of
hospitals. (qh)h2H is a prole of maximum quotas of hospitals. X := DH
is the set of contracts. Here, we assume every doctor is acceptable to every
hospital and vice versa; without this assumption, satisfying all minimum
quotas can be impossible.31
We assume hospitals are grouped into regions R = fr1; : : : ; rng, where
each region r is a subset of hospitals. Here, we allow these regions to overlap.
To be more precise, we assume R is a laminar family of H, i.e., these regions
have a hierarchical structure. Without loss of generality, we assume H 2
R holds. We assume each region, as well as each individual hospital, has
its minimum quota. More specically, for each h 2 H, ph represents the
minimum quota of hospital h, and for each r 2 R, pr represents the regional
minimum quota of region r.
Since R is a laminar family of subsets of H, R has a tree structure,
where H is the root node, and each h 2 H is a leaf node (as shown in
Figure 2 (a)). In a tree, we say region rp is the parent of another region r
if rp = argminr0)r jr0j. Similarly, we say region rp is the parent of hospital h
if rp = argminr03h jr0j. We say region r (or hospital h) is a child of region
rp if rp is a parent of r (or h). For each node r, let children(r) denote the
set of all children of r. Without loss of generality, we assume for each r,
pr 
P
r02children(r) pr0 holds (if this inequality does not hold, then one can
redene pr :=
P
r02children(r) pr0 and the constraints are unchanged). We also
assume pH = jDj, i.e., the minimum quota of the root is equal to the number
of doctors.
The model presented in Fragiadakis, Iwasaki, Troyan, Ueda, and Yokoo
31This assumption is motivated by some real-life applications. For example, in many
universities in Japan, an undergraduate student who majors in engineering must be as-
signed to a laboratory to conduct a project, and the project is required for graduation. In
this setting, every student can be assumed to be acceptable to every laboratory and vice
versa. In particular, since 2011, the third author has been applying a mechanism based on
Fragiadakis, Iwasaki, Troyan, Ueda, and Yokoo (2016) to assign students to laboratories
in Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, School of Engineering,
Kyushu University, where every student is acceptable to every laboratory and vice versa.
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(2016) is a special case of this model in which minimal quotas are imposed
only on individual hospitals.
F.2.2 Feasibility
We say X 0  X is hospital-feasible if ph  jX 0hj  qh for all h, and pr  jX 0rj
for all r. We say X 0 is doctor-feasible if jX 0dj = 1 for all d. Then, we say
X 0 is feasible if it is doctor- and hospital-feasible. Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki,
Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2016) show that if pr 
P
h2r qh and ph  qh
hold for all r and h, then a feasible matching always exists. In the rest of
this section, we assume the above conditions hold.
X 0 is hospital-feasible only if jX 0j = jDj since pH = jDj. Thus, feasibility
of X 0 requires that all doctors be matched to some hospital. It is clear that
the family of all hospital-feasible contracts does not form a matroid since ; is
not hospital-feasible. However, we can apply a technique similar to the one
used in Section 5.2, i.e., we say X 0 is semi-hospital-feasible if it is a subset of
(or equal to) a hospital-feasible matching.
F.2.3 Stability
Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2016) introduce sev-
eral concepts that are related to stability. First, in a matching X 0, a doctor
d where (d; h) 2 X 0 has a justied envy towards another doctor d0 where
(d0; h0) 2 X 0, if (d; h0) d (d; h), and (d; h0) h0 (d0; h0) hold.
Second, in a matching X 0, a doctor d where (d; h) 2 X 0 claims an
empty seat of h0 if the following conditions hold: (i) (d; h0) d (d; h), and
(ii) X 00 = X 0   (d; h) + (d; h0) is feasible.
Third, in a matching X 0, a doctor d where (d; h) 2 X 0 strongly claims
an empty seat of h0 if the following conditions hold: (i) (d; h0) d (d; h), (ii)
X 00 = X 0  (d; h)+ (d; h0) is feasible, and (iii) jX 0hj   jX 0h0j  2. The intuitive
meaning of condition (iii) is similar to KK-stability; the claim of doctor d for
moving her from h to h0 is justied if such a movement strictly decreases the
imbalance of doctors between these hospitals, but not otherwise.
We say a matching is fair if no doctor has justied envy. We say a
matching is nonwasteful if no doctor claims an empty seat, and weakly non-
wasteful if no doctor strongly claims an empty seat. In general, fairness and
nonwastefulness are incompatible, i.e., there exists a case where no matching
is fair and nonwasteful (Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim, 2014). On
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the other hand, Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2016)
show that a fair and weakly nonwasteful matching always exists.
F.2.4 Mechanism
Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2016) present a mech-
anism based on the FDA mechanism called Round-robin Selection Deferred
Acceptance mechanism for Regional Minimum Quotas (RSDA-RQ), which is
dened as follows.32
Mechanism 5 (RSDA-RQ).
Apply the following stages from k = 1.
Stage k  1
Step 1 Each doctor applies to her most preferred hospital by which she has
not been rejected before Stage k. Reset X 0 as ;.
Step 2 For each r, iterate the following procedure until all doctors applying
to hospitals in r are either tentatively accepted or rejected:
1. Choose hospital h based on the round-robin ordering.
2. Choose doctor d who is applying to h and is not tentatively ac-
cepted or rejected yet, and has the highest priority according to
h among the current applicants to h. If there exists no such
doctor, then go to the procedure for the next hospital.
3. If X 0+(d; h) is semi-hospital-feasible, d is tentatively accepted by
h and (d; h) is added to X 0. Then go to the procedure for the next
hospital.
4. Otherwise, d is rejected by h. Then go to the procedure for the
next hospital.
Step 3 If all the doctors are tentatively accepted in Step 2, then let X 0 be a
nal matching and terminate the mechanism. Otherwise, go to Stage
k + 1.
32To be more precise, Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2016) deal
with a more generalized model where regional maximum quotas are imposed as well as
regional minimum quotas. Throughout this section, we consider a simplied setting where
only regional minimum quotas exist.
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This procedure is almost identical to the FDA mechanism. The only dif-
ference is that in the RSDA-RQ mechanism, when making a decision whether
to tentatively accept (d; h) or not, the RSDA-RQ mechanism checks whether
X 0+(d; h) is semi-hospital-feasible or not. Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Kurata,
Yasuda, and Yokoo (2016) introduce a computationally ecient method to
check semi-hospital-feasibility. The matching obtained by the RSDA-RQ
mechanism is fair and weakly nonwasteful.
Fragiadakis, Iwasaki, Troyan, Ueda, and Yokoo (2016) present a mech-
anism based on the deferred acceptance mechanism called Extended Seat
Deferred Acceptance (ESDA) mechanism. The ESDA mechanism is a spe-
cial case of the RSDA-RQ mechanism for an environment in which minimal
quotas are imposed only on individual hospitals. Thus, the ESDA mechanism
is fair and weakly nonwasteful in that setting.
F.2.5 Representation in our model
In the face of nontrivial minimum quotas, the family of hospital-feasible
sets of contracts cannot be a matroid. This is because ; is not hospital-
feasible. Also, since hospital-feasibility requires that jX 0j = jDj holds, no
proper subset of X 0 can be hospital-feasible. Thus, conditions 1 and 2 in
Denition 4 are violated. Here, we consider the family of semi-hospital-
feasible sets of contracts. By denition, the family of semi-hospital-feasible
sets of contracts satises conditions 1 and 2 in Denition 4.
We create a network ow problem (Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest, and Stein,
2009) that represents these regional constraints as follows. For notational
simplicity, let qr denote
P
h2r qh.
 We set the set of start vertexes as X.
 There exists a unique terminal vertex t.
 For each h, we create an intermediate vertex v-h. There exists a di-
rected edge from each (d; h) to this vertex, whose capacity is 1. Also,
from v-h, there exists a directed edge to t, whose capacity is ph.
 For each r, we create one intermediate vertex v-r. There exists a di-
rected edge from each v-r0, where r0 2 children(r), to v-r, whose ca-
pacity is qr0   pr0 . From v-r, there exists a directed edge to t, whose
capacity is pr  
P
r02children(r) pr0 .
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Figure 2: Example of regional minimum quotas (a) and an associated network
ow problem (b)
We assume bf(X 0) = 0 if there exists a valid network ow from X 0, i.e., a
ow from X 0 to the terminal vertex t that satises capacity constraints of
edges, and otherwise,  1.
To illustrate our construction, consider the following example. Assume
there are four hospitals h1; : : : ; h4. Their maximum and minimum quotas
are 3 and 1, respectively. They are divided into two regions r1; r2. Their
minimum quotas are 3. Thus, we require at least one doctor is assigned to
both h1 and h2, and one additional doctor is assigned to either h1 or h2.
There are 8 doctors. Thus, pH is set at 8 (Figure 2 (a)).
Now we are ready to illustrate our construction of the associated network
ow problem. For h1, we create one intermediate vertex v-h1. There exists
a directed edge from each contract related with h1 to v-h1. Also, from v-h1,
there exists a directed edge to the terminal node t, whose capacity is ph1 = 1.
Similarly, for h2, we create one intermediate vertex v-h2. There exists a
directed edge from each contract related to h2 to v-h2. Also, from v-h2, there
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exists a directed edge to the terminal node t, whose capacity is ph2 = 1. The
construction related to h3 and h4 is symmetric.
Furthermore, for r1, we create one intermediate vertex v-r1. There ex-
ist edges from nodes representing hospitals in children(r1), i.e., v-h1 and
v-h2, whose capacities are qh1   ph1 = qh2   ph2 = 2. Also, from v-r1,
there exists a directed edge to the terminal node t, whose capacity is pr1  P
r02children(r1) pr0 = 3   (1 + 1) = 1. The construction related to r2 is sym-
metric. Also, for H, we create one intermediate node v-H. There exists a
directed edge from v-r1 (which is in children(H)) to v-H, whose capacity is
qr1   pr1 = 3+ 3  3 = 3. Similarly, there exists a directed edge from v-r2 to
v-H, whose capacity is 3. There exists a directed edge from v-H to t, whose
capacity is jDj  Pr2children(H) pr = 8  (3 + 3) = 2.
Figure 2 (b) shows the network ow problem of this example. Here, the
number associated to a directed edge represents its capacity.
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 6. X 0 is feasible if and only if bf(X 0) = 0 and jX 0j = jDj. X 0
is semi-hospital-feasible if and only if bf(X 0) = 0.
Proof. First, we show that X 0 is feasible if and only if bf(X 0) = 0 and jX 0j =
jDj. Assume X 0 is feasible. From the fact X 0 is hospital-feasible, jX 0j = jDj
holds. Let us dene a ow in which X 0 is the source as follows. For each edge
from (d; h) 2 X 0 to v-h, we set its ow as 1. Since X 0 is hospital feasible,
ph  jX 0hj  qh holds. Thus, the total input ow to v-h is at least ph and
at most qh. Then, for each h 2 H, we set the ow from v-h to t as ph,
and the ow from v-h to its parent r as jX 0hj   ph. This is at most qh   ph.
Thus, it is within the capacity. Also, for each r 2 R   H, the total input
ow to v-r is jX 0rj  
P
r02children(r) pr0 , which is at least pr  
P
r02children(r) pr0
and at most qr  
P
r02children(r) pr0 . Then, we set the ow from v-r to t as
pr 
P
r02children(r) pr0 , and the ow from v-r to its parent region r
0 as jX 0rj pr.
This is at most qr   pr. Thus, it is within the capacity. Finally, for H, the
total input ow to v-H is jDj  Pr2children(H) pr. Then, we set the ow from
v-H to t as jDj  Pr2children(H) pr. It is clear that the ow dened as above
is valid. Thus, bf(X 0) = 0 holds.
Next, we show that if bf(X 0) = 0 and jX 0j = jDj, then X 0 is hospital-
feasible. The total capacity of edges toward t is (jDj  Pr2children(H) pr) +P
r2R H(pr  
P
r02children(r) pr0) +
P
h2H ph = jDj. Thus, if bf(X 0) = 0 and
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jX 0j = jDj, each of these edges is saturated, i.e., its ow is equal to its
capacity. Thus, for each hospital h 2 H, jX 0hj is at least ph since the edge
from v-h to t is saturated. Also, since the ow is valid, at the edge from v-h
to r, where r is h's parent region, its ow is at most qh  ph. Thus, jX 0hj is at
most qh. Similarly, for each region r 2 R, we can recursively show that jX 0rj
is at least pr and at most qr. Thus, X
0 is feasible.
For matroid (X;F), recall that we say X 0 2 F is a base if there exists
no X 00 2 F such that X 00  X 0, i.e., X 0 is maximal. From Denition 4, it is
clear that all bases have the same size. Also, since we assume every doctor
is acceptable for all hospitals, the size of a base is jDj.
Now, let us show that if bf(X 0) = 0, X 0 is semi-hospital-feasible. We have
already shown that if bf(X 0) = 0 and jX 0j = jDj, then X 0 is hospital-feasible.
If bf(X 0) = 0 and jX 0j < jDj, let us choose a base X 00 such that X 00  X 0
holds. Then, jX 00j = jDj and bf(X 00) = 0. Thus, X 00 is hospital-feasible and
hence X 0 is semi-hospital-feasible.
Finally, let us show that if X 0 is semi-hospital-feasible, then bf(X 0) =
0. Since X 0 is semi-hospital-feasible, there exists X 00  X 0 such that X 00
is hospital-feasible. Then, bf(X 00) = 0 and from Denition 4, bf(X 0) = 0
holds.
Dene ef(X 0) in the same way as in equation (1) in Section 5.1.5. Then,
from Property 3, (X; dom bf) is a matroid. Thus, we can apply Condition 2.
With the help of these results, we are ready to show the following claim.
Proposition 7. HM-stability implies fairness and weak nonwastefulness.
Proof. Suppose X 0 is HM-stable. If doctor d prefers (d; h) to X 0d, then no
(d0; h) with (d; h) h (d0; h) is in X 0 by the denition of HM-stability and the
denition of the payo function f . Thus, HM-stability implies fairness. Also,
if doctor d prefers (d; h0) to (d; h) and (d; h) 2 X 0 while X 0  (d; h)+(d; h0) is
feasible, then jX 0hj jX 0h0 j  1 must hold, i.e., moving d from h to h0 does not
strictly decrease the imbalance of doctors between h and h0, by the denition
of HM-stability and the construction of f . Thus, HM-stability implies weak
nonwastefulness.
We note that fairness and weak nonwastefulness do not imply HM-stability.
To see this, let us consider the following case. There are three hospitals h1; h2
and h3 and two doctors d1 and d2. The minimum quota of h1 is 1 and the
minimum quotas of the other hospitals are 0. No regional minimum quota
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is imposed. We assume h1 d1 h2 d1 h3 and h2 d2 h3 d2 h1 hold.
The round-robin ordering over hospitals is dened as h1; h2; h3. All hospi-
tals prefer d1 over d2. We assume the individual maximum quota of each
hospital is large enough. X 0 = f(d1; h1); (d2; h3)g is fair and weakly non-
wasteful. In particular, (d2; h2) satises conditions (i) and (ii) for strongly
claiming an empty seat, but condition (iii) does not hold since jX 0h3j = 1 andjX 0h2 j = 0. However, X 0 is not HM-stable since (d2; h2) 2 ChD(X 0+ (d2; h2))
and (d2; h2) 2 ChH(X 0 + (d2; h2)) hold.
The RSDA-RQ mechanism is identical to the generalized DA mechanism
where ChH is dened as the maximizer of f described above. The ESDA
is identical to the generalized DA mechanism where ChH is dened as the
maximizer of f described above, when minimal quotas are imposed only on
individual hospitals.
F.3 Controlled school choice (Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez,
and Yildirim, 2014)
F.3.1 Model
This section studies a model of matching with diversity constraints. Although
the original contribution by Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014)
frames the model in the context of student placement in schools, we stick to
our terminology of doctors and hospitals.
A market is a tuple (D;H;X; (d)d2D; (h)h2H ; (qh)h2H ; T; ; (qTh )h2H ; (qTh )h2H).
The denitions ofD;H;X;d;h, and qh are identical to the standard model.
One major dierence between this model and the standard ones is that
we assume each doctor d has her type (d) 2 T = ft1; : : : ; tkg. A type of
a doctor may represent race, income, gender, or any socioeconomic status.
Furthermore, each hospital has soft minimum and maximum bounds for each
type t, i.e., (qT
h
)h2H and (qTh )h2H , where q
T
h
= (qt
h
)t2T and qTh = (q
t
h)t2T . Each
qt
h
and qth represent minimum and maximum bounds for type t at hospital
h. We assume
P
t2T q
t
h
 qh holds, i.e., the minimum bounds for all types in
h can be satised without violating the maximum quota of the hospital. For
X 0  X, let X 0h;t denote f(d; h) 2 X 0 j d 2 D; (d) = tg.
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F.3.2 Feasibility
The bounds qt
h
and qth are soft bounds and do not aect feasibility. We say
X 0  X is hospital-feasible if jX 0hj  qh for all h. We say X 0  X is doctor-
feasible if X 0d is acceptable for all d. Then, we say X
0 is feasible if it is doctor-
and hospital-feasible.
F.3.3 Stability
Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014) introduce a stability concept,
which we call Ehlers-Hafalir-Yenmez-Yildirim (EHYY)-stability. For a match-
ing X 0, we say (d; h) 2 X n X 0 is an EHYY-blocking pair, where (d) = t,
if (d; h) is acceptable for d and (d; h) d X 0d, and any one of the following
conditions holds:
(i) jX 0hj < qh,
(ii) jX 0h;tj < qth, or
(iii) there exists another doctor d0, such that (d0; h) 2 X 0 and (d0) = t0
hold, and any one of the following conditions holds:
(a) t = t0 and (d; h) h (d0; h),
(b) t 6= t0, qt
h
 jX 0h;tj < qth, qt0h < jX 0h;t0j  qt
0
h , and (d; h) h (d0; h),
(c) t 6= t0, qt
h
 jX 0h;tj < qth, and jX 0h;t0j > qt0h , or
(d) t 6= t0, jX 0h;tj  qth, jX 0h;t0 j > qt0h , and (d; h) h (d0; h).
We say a matching X 0 is EHYY-stable if there exists no EHYY-blocking
pair.
Intuitively, this stability concept means that for each type t, up to qt
h
doctors of type t can be assigned to hospital h without competing against
doctors of other types. Then, if more type t doctors hope to be assigned to
h, they can be assigned up to qth but these doctors must compete against
doctors of other types. Furthermore, if more type t doctors beyond qth hope
to be assigned to h, they can be assigned only when qh is not lled yet by
accepting doctors of type t0 6= t up to qt0h .
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F.3.4 Mechanism
Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014) present a mechanism called the
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Soft Bounds (DAASB), whose outcome
satises EHYY-stability. The DAASB mechanism is dened as follows.
Mechanism 6 (DAASB).
Apply the following stages from k = 1.
Stage k  1
Step 1 Each doctor applies to her most preferred hospital by which she has
not been rejected before Stage k. If no remaining hospital is acceptable
for d, d does not apply to any hospital. Reset X 0 as ;.
Step 2 For each hospital h, iterate the following procedure until all doctors
applying to h are either tentatively accepted or rejected:
Phase 1: 1. Choose doctor d who is applying to h and is not tenta-
tively accepted, rejected, or postponed to the next phase yet,
and has the highest priority according to h among current
applicants to h. If there exists no such doctor, then go to the
procedure for the next phase.
2. If jX 0h;(d)j < q(d)h , then d is tentatively accepted by h and
(d; h) is added to X 0. Then go to the procedure for the next
doctor.
3. Otherwise, the decision on d is postponed to the next phase.
Go to the procedure for the next doctor.
Phase 2: 1. Choose doctor d who is applying to h and is not tenta-
tively accepted, rejected, or postponed to the next phase yet,
and has the highest priority according to h among current
applicants to h. If there exists no such doctor, then go to the
procedure for the next phase.
2. If jX 0hj = qh then reject all doctors applying to h who have
not been tentatively accepted yet. Go to the procedure for
the next hospital. If jX 0h;(d)j < q(d)h , then d is tentatively
accepted by h and (d; h) is added to X 0. Then go to the
procedure for the next doctor.
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3. Otherwise, the decision on d is postponed to the next phase.
Go to the procedure for the next doctor.
Phase 3: 1. Choose doctor d who is applying to h and is not tenta-
tively accepted, or rejected yet, and has the highest priority
according to h among current applicants to h. If there exists
no such doctor, then go to the procedure for the next hospital.
2. If jX 0hj = qh then reject all doctors applying to h who are not
tentatively accepted yet. Go to the procedure for the next
hospital.
3. Otherwise, d is tentatively accepted by h and (d; h) is added
to X 0. Then go to the procedure for the next doctor.
Step 3 If all the doctors are tentatively accepted in Step 2, then let X 0 be a
nal matching and terminate the mechanism. Otherwise, go to Stage
k + 1.
F.3.5 Representation in our model
Let us consider an extended market (D;H; ~X; ( ~d)d2D; f). Here, a contract
x 2 ~X is represented as (d; h; s), where d 2 D, h 2 H, and s 2 f0; 1; 2g.
s = 0; 1; 2 are interpreted to mean that doctor d is accepted at hospital h
for type (d)'s priority seat, normal seat, and extended seat, respectively.
As described later, we introduce such a seat distinction to satisfy EHYY-
stability. From the matching in the extended market ~X 0, the matching in
the original marketX 0 is obtained by mapping each contract (d; h; s) to (d; h).
Let ~X 0h;t;s denote f(d; h; s) 2 ~X 0 j d 2 D; (d) = tg.
We dene the modied preference of each doctor d, denoted ~d such that
(d; h; s) ~d(d; h0; s0) holds for any h 6= h0, s, and s0 if (d; h) d (d; h0), and
(d; h; 0) ~d(d; h; 1) ~d(d; h; 2) holds for any h, i.e., for each h, doctor d prefers
h's priority seat over its normal seat, and its normal seat over its extended
seat.
For the extended market, let us assume for each x, its value v(x) is dened.
We assume v((d; h; 0)) > v((d0; h; 1)) and v((d; h; 1)) > v((d0; h; 2)) hold for
any d; d0, and h, i.e., hospitals rst try to ll their priority seats, then normal
seats, and nally extended seats. Also, we assume v((d; h; s)) > v((d0; h; s))
if (d; h) h (d0; h), i.e., the preference of an individual hospital over doctors
is respected, as long as doctors have the same type.
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Let us dene bf( ~X 0) as 0 when j ~X 0hj  qh, j ~X 0h;t;0j  qth, and j ~X 0h;t;1j 
qth   qth hold for all h 2 H and t 2 T , and otherwise,  1. Intuitively, these
denitions mean that the number of priority seats of hospital h for type t
doctors is qt
h
, and the number of normal seats is qth   qth.
Also, let us dene ef( ~X 0) asPx2 ~X0 v(x). ( ~X; dom bf) is a laminar matroid,
since T = f ~Xh;t;s j h 2 H; t 2 T; s 2 f0; 1; 2gg [ f ~Xh j h 2 Hg is a laminar
family of ~X. Thus, we can apply Condition 1. The matching obtained by
the DAASB mechanism is identical to the matching in the original market
mapped from the outcome of the generalized DA mechanism where ChH is
dened as the maximizer of function f .
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 8. HM-stability of ~X 0 in the extended market implies EHYY-
stability of X 0 in the original market.
Proof. Assume (d; h) is an EHYY-blocking pair in the original market, where
(d) = t. If condition (i) of an EHYY-blocking pair holds, by choosing x =
(d; h; 2), x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) and x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) hold. Also, if condition (ii)
holds, j ~X 0h;t;0j < qth holds. Thus, by choosing x = (d; h; 0), x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x)
and x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) hold. Then, in either case, ~X 0 is not HM-stable.
Assume condition (iii) holds, so there exists another doctor d0 such that
(d0) = t0 and d0 is assigned to h. If condition (a) holds, (d0; h; s) 2 ~X 0
and v((d; h; s)) > v((d0; h; s)) must hold. Thus, x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) and x 2
ChH( ~X 0 + x) hold. If condition (b) holds, (d0; h; 1) 2 ~X 0, j ~X 0h;t;1j < qth   qth,
and v((d; h; 1)) > v((d0; h; 1)) must hold. Thus, by choosing x = (d; h; 1), x 2
ChD( ~X 0+x) and x 2 ChH( ~X 0+x) hold. If condition (c) holds, (d0; h; 2) 2 ~X 0,
j ~X 0h;t;1j < qth qth, and v((d; h; 1)) > v((d0; h; 2)) must hold. Thus, by choosing
x = (d; h; 1), x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) and x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) hold. If condition (d)
holds, (d0; h; 2) 2 ~X 0 and v((d; h; 2)) > v((d0; h; 2)) must hold. Thus, by
choosing x = (d; h; 2), x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) and x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) hold. Thus,
in any of these cases, ~X 0 is not HM-stable.
For a matching in the extended market, the corresponding matching in
the original market is uniquely determined, but multiple matchings in the
extended market can be mapped onto an identical matching in the original
market. Thus, whether EHYY-stability in the original market implies HM-
stability in the extended market or not depends on how to determine the
mapping from the original market to the extended market. However, since
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the generalized DA mechanism is identical to the DAASB mechanism, it
obtains the doctor-optimal EHYY-stable matching.
F.4 Student-project allocation (Abraham, Irving, and
Manlove, 2007)
F.4.1 Model
In the Student-Project Allocation (SPA) problem, a market is represented
as a tuple (S; P; L;X; (s)s2S; (l)l2L; (ql)l2L; (qp)p2P ). S is a nite set of
students, P is a nite set of projects, and L is a nite set of lecturers. Each
project p 2 P is oered by some lecturer l 2 L. Let Pl denote the set of
projects oered by lecturer l. Each contract x 2 X is a pair (s; p), which
represents the assignment of student s to project p. For X 0  X, let X 0s
denote f(s; p) 2 X 0 j p 2 Pg and X 0l denote f(s; p) 2 X 0 j s 2 S; p 2 Plg.
For each s 2 S, s represents the preference of student s over acceptable
contracts in Xs. For each l 2 L, l represents the preference of lecturer l
over S, and ql represents the maximum quota of lecturer l. For each p 2 P ,
qp represents the maximum quota of project p.
F.4.2 Feasibility
We say X 0  X is student-feasible if X 0s is acceptable for each s 2 S. We say
X 0  X is lecturer-feasible if jX 0l j  ql holds for all l 2 L, and jX 0pj  qp holds
for all p 2 P . Then, we say X 0 is feasible if it is student- and lecturer-feasible.
F.4.3 Stability
For a matching X 0, a contract (s; p) 2 X nX 0, where p 2 Pl, is an Abraham-
Irving-Manlove (AIM) blocking pair of X 0 if (i) (s; p) is acceptable for
s, (ii) (s; p) s X 0s, and (iii) one of the following conditions holds:
(a) jX 0pj < qp and jX 0l j < ql.
(b) jX 0pj < qp and jX 0l j = ql, and either X 0s = f(s; p0)g and p0 2 Pl, or there
exists (s0; p00) 2 X 0, such that p00 2 Pl and s l s0.
(c) jX 0pj = qp and there exists (s0; p) 2 X 0, such that s l s0.
We say a matching X 0 is Abraham-Irving-Manlove (AIM)-stable if
it has no AIM-blocking pair.
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F.4.4 Mechanism
Abraham, Irving, and Manlove (2007) present two mechanisms based on the
DA mechanism. One is called SPA-student, in which students make oers,
and the other is called SPA-lecturer, in which lecturers make oers. Both
mechanisms produce AIM-stable matchings. Although Abraham, Irving, and
Manlove (2007) do not examine strategyproofness, the SPA-student is strat-
egyproof for students. The SPA-student is dened as follows.
Mechanism 7 (SPA-student).
Apply the following stages from k = 1.
Stage k  1
Step 1 Each student s applies to her most preferred project by which she has
not been rejected before Stage k. If no remaining project is acceptable
for s, s does not apply to any project. Reset X 0 as ;.
Step 2 For each lecturer l, iterate the following procedure until all students
applying to projects in Pl are either tentatively accepted or rejected:
1. Choose s, where s is applying to some project p 2 Pl, s has not
been tentatively accepted or rejected yet in any previous step of
this stage, and s has the highest priority according to l among
the students currently applying to some project oered by lecturer
l.
2. If jX 0pj < qp and jX 0l j < ql, s is tentatively accepted by p and (s; p)
is added to X 0. Then go to the procedure for the next student.
3. Otherwise, s is rejected by p. Then go to the procedure for the
next student.
Step 3 If all the students are tentatively accepted in Step 2, then let X 0 be
a nal matching and terminate the mechanism. Otherwise, go to Stage
k + 1.
F.4.5 Representation in our model
Let us dene bf(X 0) as 0 if X 0 is lecturer-feasible, i.e., jX 0pj  qp for all p 2 P
and jX 0l j  ql for all l 2 L, and otherwise,  1. Then, (X; dom bf) is a
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laminar matroid, since T = fXl1 ; Xl2 ; : : : ; Xp1 ; Xp2 ; : : :g is a laminar family
of X.
Let us assume there exists an ordering p1; p2; : : : among projects within
Pl. Then, let us dene a positive value v(x) for each x 2 X with the following
properties: for every p; p0 2 Pl, v((s; p)) > v((s0; p0)) if s l s0, and v((s; p)) >
v((s; p0)) if p appears earlier than p0 in the above ordering over Pl.
Let us assume ef(X 0) is given as Px2X0 v(x). Then, we can apply Condi-
tion 1. SPA-student is identical to the generalized DA mechanism where the
choice function of the lecturers ChL is dened as the maximizer of function
f .
The following proposition establishes a connection between HM-stability
and AIM-stability.
Proposition 9. AIM-stability implies HM-stability.
Proof. If X 0 is AIM-stable, then the rst condition for HM-stability, namely
X 0 = ChL(X 0) = ChS(X 0), is obvious. We show that if there exists (s; p) 2
X nX 0 such that (s; p) 2 ChL(X 0+(s; p)) and (s; p) 2 ChS(X 0+(s; p)) hold,
then (s; p) is an AIM-blocking pair.
By way of contradiction, let us assume (s; p) is not an AIM-blocking pair.
From the fact that (s; p) 2 ChS(X 0 + (s; p)), (s; p) is acceptable for s. Also,
either (s; p) s (s; p0) holds where (s; p0) 2 X 0, or X 0s = ;.
Assume p 2 Pl. Since (s; p) is not an AIM-blocking pair, either jX 0pj = qp
or jX 0l j = ql holds. Since (s; p) 2 ChL(X 0 + (s; p)), there exists (s0; p0) 2 X 0
such that (s0; p0) 62 ChL(X 0+(s; p)) and p0 2 Pl hold (otherwise, jX 0pj < qp and
jX 0l j < ql hold). Since (s0; p0) 62 ChL(X 0+(s; p)) and (s; p) 2 ChL(X 0+(s; p)),
s l s0 or s = s0 hold. In either case, (s; p) becomes an AIM-blocking pair.
This is a contradiction.
We note that there exist cases in which a matching X 0 is HM-stable
but not AIM-stable. To see this, assume there exist one student s and two
projects p1 and p2, and both projects are provided by the same lecturer l.
The order on Pl is p2; p1. s prefers p1 to p2. In this example, X
0 = f(s; p2)g
is stable, since ChL(X
0 + (s; p1)) = X 0, but it is not AIM-stable since (s; p1)
is an AIM-blocking pair under the denition of AIM-stability. However, the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 10. The generalized DA mechanism obtains the doctor-optimal
AIM-stable matching.
65
Proof. Since the generalized DAmechanism obtains the student-optimal HM-
stable matching and AIM-stability implies HM-stability, it suces to show
that the student-optimal HM-stable matching satises AIM-stability. To
show the latter, let us assume by way of contradiction that X 0 is the student-
optimal HM-stable matching but it is not AIM-stable, i.e., there is an AIM-
blocking pair (s; p) 2 X n X 0. Let p 2 Pl. Since X 0 is HM-stable, cases
(a) and (c) in the denition of an AIM-blocking pair in Section F.4.3 are not
possible. Thus the only possibility is that jX 0pj < qp, jX 0l j = ql, X 0s = f(s; p0)g,
and p0 2 Pl hold, i.e., s is assigned to project p0, although s prefers another
project p, while p0 and p are held by the same lecturer l and p is not full. Let
X 00 = X 0  (s; p0)+ (s; p). It is clear that X 00 is HM-stable, s prefers X 00 over
X 0, and other students are indierent between X 00 and X 0. This contradicts
the assumption that X 0 is the student-optimal HM-stable matching.
In the above example, the generalized DA mechanism returns f(s; p1)g,
which is AIM-stable.
F.5 Cadet-branch matching (Sonmez and Switzer, 2013)
F.5.1 Model
A market is a tuple (I; B; T;X; (i)i2I ;B; (qb)b2B; (pb)b2B). I is a nite set
of cadets and B is a nite set of branches of the military. T = ft0; t+g is
a pair of terms, where t0 means that a cadet serves for a standard term,
and t+ means that a cadet serves for an extended term, which is longer
than the standard term. X := I B  T is the set of contracts. A contract
x = (i; b; t) means i is matched with b with term t. For X 0  X, let X 0i denote
f(i; b; t) 2 X 0 j t 2 T; b 2 Bg and X 0b denote f(i; b; t) 2 X 0 j i 2 I; t 2 Tg.
For each i 2 I, i represents the preference of cadet i over acceptable
contracts in Xi. B is the priority ordering (master-list) over the cadets,
which is common to all branches. For each b 2 B, qb represents the maximum
quota of branch b, and pb < qb represents the reserved quota for extended-
term contracts at branch b.
F.5.2 Feasibility
We say X 0  X is cadet-feasible if X 0i is acceptable for all i. We say X 0  X
is branch-feasible if jX 0bj  qb holds for all b 2 B. Then, we say X 0 is feasible
if it is cadet- and branch-feasible.
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F.5.3 Stability
We say a matching X 0 is fair if for each pair of contracts (i; b; t); (i0; b0; t0) 2
X 0, (i; b0; t0) i (i; b; t) implies i0 B i (Sonmez and Switzer, 2013). In other
words, fairness requires that a higher-priority cadet never envies the assign-
ment of a lower-priority cadet.
F.5.4 Mechanism
Sonmez and Switzer (2013) present a mechanism called the Cadet-Optimal
Stable Mechanism (COSM), which is dened as follows.33 The COSM always
produces a fair matching.
Mechanism 8 (COSM).
Apply the following stages from k = 1.
Stage k  1
Step 1 Each cadet i chooses her most preferred contract (i; b; t) which has
not been rejected before Stage k and applies to b with term t. If no
remaining contract is acceptable for i, i does not apply to any branch.
Reset X 0 as ;.
Step 2 For each b, iterate the following procedure until all cadets applying
to b are either tentatively accepted or rejected:
Phase 1: Choose cadet i such that i has the highest priority according
to B among the applicants to b, who are applying to b with term
t (t can be either t0 or t+) and are not tentatively accepted yet. If
there exists no such cadet, then go to the procedure for the next
branch. If jX 0bj < qb  pb, tentatively accept i to b and add (i; b; t)
to X 0, and go to the procedure for the next cadet. Otherwise, go
to the procedure for the next phase.
33To be more precise, the COSM presented in Sonmez and Switzer (2013) is slightly
dierent from the one presented here. The dierence would matter when branch b han-
dles two contracts oered by the same cadet i, i.e., (i; b; t0) and (i; b; t+). However, this
dierence does not matter since b handles cadet-feasible contracts only. Allowing multiple
contracts between the same pair of agents, as is done in the present paper, enables the
preference to satisfy substitutability. This technique has been used in Kamada and Ko-
jima (2014, 2015) and Goto, Iwasaki, Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014) in the context
of matching with constraints. See also Hateld and Kominers (2009, 2014) who study this
issue further.
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Phase 2: Choose cadet i such that i has the highest priority according
to B among the applicants to b, who are applying to b with
the extended term t+ and are not tentatively accepted yet. If
there exists no such cadet, then go to the next phase. If jX 0bj <
qb, tentatively accept i to b, add (i; b; t+) to X
0, and go to the
procedure for the next cadet. Otherwise, reject all cadets applying
to b who are not tentatively accepted yet. Go to the procedure
for the next branch.
Phase 3: Choose cadet i such that i has the highest priority according
to B among the applicants to b, who are applying to b with the
standard term t0 and are not tentatively accepted yet. If there
exists no such cadet, then go to the procedure for the next branch.
If jX 0bj < qb, tentatively accept i to b, add (i; b; t0) to X 0, and go
to the procedure for the next cadet. Otherwise, reject all cadets
applying to b who are not tentatively accepted yet. Go to the
procedure for the next branch.
Step 3 If all the cadets are tentatively accepted in Step 2, then let X 0 be a
nal matching and terminate the mechanism. Otherwise, go to Stage
k + 1.
F.5.5 Representation in our model
Let us consider an extended market (I; B; T; ~X; ~I ; f). For each contract
(i; b; t+) in X, we create two contracts (i; b; t+; 0) and (i; b; t+; 1) in the ex-
tended market. Here, (i; b; t+; 0) and (i; b; t+; 1) are interpreted to mean i
is accepted to b for its priority seat and normal seat, respectively. For each
contract (i; b; t0), we create a single contract (i; b; t0; 1) in the extended mar-
ket.
We obtain the modied preference of each cadet i, denoted ~i, such that
(i; b; t; s) ~i(i; b0; t0; s0) holds for any b; b0; s; s0; t, and t0, if (i; b; t) i (i; b0; t0),
and (i; b; t+; 1) ~i(i; b; t+; 0) holds for any b (as long as (i; b; t+) is acceptable
for i).
From the matching in the extended market ~X 0, the matching in the origi-
nal market X 0 is obtained by mapping each contract (i; b; t; s) to (i; b; t). For
~X 0  ~X, let ~X 0b;s denote f(i; b; t; s) 2 ~X 0 j i 2 I; t 2 Tg.
For each x 2 ~X, we dene its value v(x). We assume v() respects B
in the sense that if i B i0, v((i; b; t; s)) > v((i0; b; t; s)) holds for all b, t, and
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s. Also assume v((i; b; t+; 0)) > v((i
0; b0; t; 1)) for all i; i0; b; b0, and t, i.e., a
contract for a priority seat has a larger value than any contract for a normal
seat.
Let us dene bf( ~X 0) as 0 when j ~X 0bj  qb and j ~X 0b;0j  pb hold for all
b 2 B, and  1 otherwise. Also, let us dene ef( ~X 0) as Px2 ~X0 v(x). Then,
( ~X; dom bf) is a laminar matroid, since T = f ~Xb;s j b 2 B; s 2 f0; 1gg [ f ~Xb j
b 2 Bg is a laminar family of ~X. Thus, we can apply Condition 1. COSM
is identical to the generalized DA mechanism where the choice function of
branches ChB is dened as the maximizer of function f .
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 11. HM-stability of ~X 0 in the extended market implies fairness
of X 0 in the original market.
Proof. Assume X 0 is not fair, i.e., there exist (i; b; t); (i0; b0; t0) 2 X 0 such
that (i; b0; t0) i (i; b; t) and i B i0 hold. Consider the case where t0 = t+
and (i0; b0; t+; s) 2 ~X 0. Then, if we choose x = (i; b0; t+; s), it is clear that
x 2 ChI( ~X 0 + x) and x 2 ChB( ~X 0 + x) because v(i; b0; t+; s) > v(i0; b0; t+; s).
Consider the case where t0 = t0 and (i0; b0; t0; 1) 2 ~X 0. Then, if we choose
x = (i; b0; t0; 1), it is clear that x 2 ChI( ~X 0+x) and x 2 ChB( ~X 0+x) because
v(i; b0; t0; 1) > v(i0; b0; t0; 1).
On the other hand, HM-stability is not implied by fairness. To see this,
let a cadet i hope to be assigned branch b with term t+ but she is not accepted
by b in X 0, while jX 0b;0j < pb. Then X 0 is not HM-stable, even if each cadet
assigned to b has a higher priority than i (thus X 0 is fair).
Fairness as dened in Section F.5.3 is a mild requirement, and the cadet-
optimal fair matching does not always exist. Thus, neither the generalized
DA mechanism nor the COSM always produce the cadet-optimal fair match-
ing.
F.6 Regional maximum quotas with regionally priori-
tized doctors
In this subsection, instead of examining an existing application, we consider
a new application. Specically, we study a situation where several dierent
constraints must be satised simultaneously.
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Assume hospitals are partitioned into regions as in Section 5.1, each with
a regional maximum quota. In addition, each region is associated with \re-
gionally prioritized doctors" who are granted priority for placement in that
region over other doctors. More specically, each hospital in the region is
required to accept the regionally prioritized doctors up to a certain number
even if the hospital prefers other doctors.
A case in point is Japanese medical residency matching. As described ear-
lier, the Japanese government imposes a regional maximum quota on each
region of the country for medical residency matching. Furthermore, there is
a discussion on giving priorities to residents who received regional scholar-
ships. More specically, some regions have scholarship programs to medical
students. If a student who received the scholarship from a region becomes a
medical resident in that region, she does not need to pay back the scholar-
ship. However, if she fails be a medical resident in that region (even if she
wanted to), she needs to pay back the scholarship. Given this nature of the
scholarship, there is a discussion among policymakers to give some priority
to such students for positions in that region.
Another possible example is centralized admission to public universities.
Assume each region has regional maximum quotas due to its budget lim-
itation, for instance. At the same time, the region gives some priority to
students who live in the region.
In this subsection, we show how to model such situations in our frame-
work. A market is a tuple
(D;H;X;R; (d)d2D;H ; (ph)h2H ; (qh)h2H ; (qr)r2R; ):
The denitions of D;H;X;R;d; qh, and qr are identical to the model pre-
sented in Section 5.1.  : D ! R [ f;g returns the region where doctor d is
regionally prioritized. If (d) = ;, it means that no region regionally prefers
d.
For X 0  X, let X 0r;h denote f(d; h) j (d; h) 2 X 0; h 2 r; r = (d)g,
i.e., the subset of contracts in X 0 involving doctors prioritized in region r
and h 2 r. Each hospital h 2 r has a minimum quota ph for regionally
prioritized doctors of region r. As in Section F.3, these minimum quotas are
soft bounds and do not aect feasibility. We assume
P
h2r ph  qr holds for
all r 2 R, i.e., the regional maximum quota of r is large enough to satisfy
the minimum quotas of regionally prioritized doctors for all h 2 r. As in the
case of contract-order stability, we assume there exists a total order H over
X.
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We say X 0 is doctor-feasible if X 0d is acceptable for all d. We say X
0 is
hospital-feasible if jX 0hj  qh and jX 0rj  qr hold for all h 2 H and r 2 R.
Then, we say X 0 is feasible if it is doctor- and hospital-feasible.
For a matching X 0, we say (d; h) 2 XnX 0 (where h 2 r) is a blocking pair,
if (d; h) is acceptable for d and (d; h) d X 0d, and any one of the following
conditions holds:
(i) (d) = r and jX 0r;hj < ph,
(ii) jX 0hj < qh and jX 0rj < qr,
(iii) jX 0hj < qh, jX 0rj = qr, there exists h0 2 r such that (d; h0) 2 X 0,
(d; h) H (d; h0), and either (iii-a) (d) = r and jX 0r;h0 j > ph0 , or (iii-b)
(d) 6= r holds, or
(iv) there exists (d0; h) 2 X 0, such that (d; h) H (d0; h), and any one of the
following conditions holds:
(iv-a) (d0) 6= r,
(iv-b) (d) = (d0) = r, or
(iv-c) (d) 6= r; (d0) = r, and jX 0r;hj > ph.
We say a matching X 0 is stable if there exists no blocking pair according to
the above denition.
In this denition, conditions (i)-(iv) list the cases in which the formation
of a matching between doctor d and hospital h is regarded as a \legitimate"
blocking in the presence of constraints. More specically, (i) is a case in
which d is a regionally prioritized doctor in r and there is an available seat
reserved for regionally prioritized doctors in h; (ii) is a case in which h has
an empty seat and its region r has room for another doctor; (iii) is a case in
which the region r is full, but d is currently matched with another hospital h0
in r, H prefers (d; h) over (d; h0), and moving d away from h0 will not cause
the minimum quota for regionally prioritized doctors at h0 to be violated;
(iv) is a case in which h is currently matched with a less preferred doctor d0,
and moving d0 away from h will not cause the minimum quota for regionally
prioritized doctors at h to be violated.
To represent this problem using our framework, let us consider an ex-
tended market given by tuple
(D;H; ~X;R; ( ~d)D; ~H ; (ph)h2H ; (qh)h2H ; (qr)r2R; ):
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Each contract x 2 ~X is represented as a triple (d; h; t) where d 2 D, h 2 H,
and t 2 f0; 1g. We assume that contracts of the form (d; h; 0) are available
only to a regionally prioritized doctor such that h 2 (d). The triple (d; h; 0)
is interpreted as a contract in which d 2 D is assigned to a priority seat of
hospital h, and (d; h; 1) is interpreted as a contract in which d is assigned to
a normal seat of hospital h. For d 2 D, ~d is obtained from d such that
for any h; h0 2 H, (d; h; 1) ~d(d; h0; 1) if and only if (d; h) d (d; h0). Also,
for each h 2 (d), (d; h; 0) ~d(d; h; 1) holds. Furthermore, for any d 2 D and
any h; h0 2 (d), (d; h; 0) ~d(d; h0; 0) if and only if (d; h) d (d; h0). ~H is
obtained from H such that for any h; h0; d; d0, and t, (d; h; t) ~H(d0; h0; t) if
and only if (d; h) H (d0; h0) holds, and (d; h; 0) ~H(d0; h0; 1) holds for any
h; h0; d and d0, where h 2 (d). Let v(x) denote the value of contract x which
respects ~H , i.e., v(x) > v(x0) holds if and only if x~Hx0. Let ~X 0h;t denote
f(d; h; t) 2 X 0 j d 2 Dg.
Let us dene bf( ~X 0) as 0 when j ~X 0hj  qh, j ~X 0rj  qr, and j ~X 0h;0j  ph hold
for all h 2 H and r 2 R, and  1 otherwise. Also, let us dene ef( ~X 0) asP
x2 ~X0 v(x).
Then, ( ~X; dom bf) is a laminar matroid since T = f ~Xh;t j h 2 H; t 2
f0; 1gg [ f ~Xh j h 2 Hg [ f ~Xr j r 2 Rg is a laminar family of ~X. Thus, we
can apply Condition 1.
From the matching in the extended market ~X 0, the matching in the orig-
inal market X 0 is obtained by mapping each contract (d; h; t) to (d; h). The
following proposition holds.
Proposition 12. HM-stability of ~X 0 in the extended market implies that
there exists no blocking pair in the original market.
Proof. Assume (d; h) is a blocking pair and condition (i) holds. Then, by
choosing x = (d; h; 0), x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) and x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) hold. If
condition (ii) holds, by choosing x = (d; h; 1), x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) and x 2
ChD( ~X
0 + x) hold since ~X 0 + x is feasible.
Assume condition (iii) holds. If (iii-a) holds, then there exists at least
one regionally prioritized doctor d0 in r, who is assigned to a normal seat
of h0, i.e., (d0; h0; 1) is included in ~X 0, and (d; h; 1) ~H(d0; h0; 1) hold. By
choosing x = (d; h; 1), x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) and x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) hold since
(d; h; 1) ~H(d0; h0; 1) holds. If (iii-b) holds, (d; h0; 1) is included in ~X 0. By
choosing x = (d; h; 1), x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) and x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) hold since
(d; h; 1) ~H(d; h0; 1) holds.
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Next, assume condition (iv) holds, i.e., there exists (d0; h) 2 X 0 such that
(d; h) H (d0; h) holds. If condition (iv-a) holds, then (d0; h; 1) 2 ~X 0 and
(d; h; 1) ~H(d0; h; 1) hold. Thus, if we choose x = (d; h; 1), x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x)
and x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) hold. If condition (iv-b) holds, then (d0; h; t) 2 ~X 0
(where t can be either 0 or 1) and (d; h; t) ~H(d0; h; t) hold. Thus, if we choose
x = (d; h; t), x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x) and x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) hold. If condition (iv-
c) holds, then there exists at least one regionally prioritized doctor d00 in r
(d00 can be equal to d0), who is assigned to a normal seat of h in ~X 0 and
(d; h; 1) ~H(d00; h; 1) hold. Thus, if we choose x = (d; h; 1), x 2 ChH( ~X 0 + x)
and x 2 ChD( ~X 0 + x) hold.
Thus, if there exists a blocking pair, ~X 0 is not HM-stable.
G Discussions
G.1 Relations between applications
The SPA problem in Section F.4 can be represented using the regional max-
imum quota model in Section 5.1, by letting projects provided by the same
lecturer Pl form a region and its regional maximum quota be set at ql. In
the SPA problem, individual projects in Pl do not have their own prefer-
ences over students; one can interpret that all projects in Pl use a common
preference l. As a result, AIM-stability implies strong stability dened in
Section 5.1. Thus, AIM-stability is stronger than KK-stability or contract-
order-stability.34
The model presented in Section 4 of Biro, Fleiner, Irving, and Manlove
(2010) can be regarded as a generalization of the SPA problem, where the
constraints have a laminar structure and maximum quotas are imposed at
each element of the laminar family. Biro, Fleiner, Irving, and Manlove (2010)
show that a stable matching always exists and a modication of the standard
DAmechanism obtains a stable matching. Clearly, our analysis in Section F.4
can be generalized to this environment.
34AIM-stability does not coincide with strong stability or KK-stability or contract-order
stability in general. Thus our analysis of the SPA problem is not subsumed by our analysis
of regional maximum quotas.
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G.2 Aggregation of individual hospital preferences
Recall the model of matching with regional maximum quotas in Section 5.1.
As illustrated there, there may be several alternative methods for aggregating
the preferences of individual hospitals into a single preference of the hospitals.
One method is to introduce an order over hospitals to determine a preference
over the numbers of accepted contracts at each hospital (as used in KK-
stability). Then, which contracts should be accepted at each hospital is
determined by the individual preference of the hospital. Another method
is to generate an ordering among contracts that respects the preferences of
individual hospitals (as in contract-order stability). As seen in Section 5.1,
both types of aggregated hospital preferences can be represented by M\-
concave functions.
Of course, what preference aggregation employ depends on what stability
concept one adopts as the solution concept. This amounts to deciding a
criterion for socially desirable outcomes. Recommending one criterion over
another is not the goal of the present paper, because the decision would
involve a value judgment by the members of the society, and it is likely to
depend on specic applied contexts. Our contribution is to provide a tool
for achieving a desirable outcome given societal preferences, and we aimed
to accommodate as wide a range of constraints and societal preferences as
possible.
In this regard, one advantage of our methodology is that it is general and
exible enough to subsume a wide class of aggregated preferences including
both those corresponding to KK-stability and contract-order stability. Recall
the function ef representing the hospitals' soft preferences as in KK-stability,ef(X 0) =X
h2H
Vh(jX 0hj) +
X
x2X0
v(x); (5)
where Vh(k) =
Pk
j=1 vh(j) and vhi(j) = C(C jHjj i) with a constant C >
0. Contrary to the case in KK-stability, however, let us relax the assumption
C  v(x), and allow for arbitrary relations between vhi(j) and v(x). Even
under this relaxation, by Condition 2, it follows that function f = bf + ef
as dened in Section 5.1.5 is M\-concave, and thus all our results hold with
respect to this function f , including the existence of an HM-stable matching
and strategyproofness for doctors of the generalized DA mechanism.
As mentioned above, the function ef in equation (5) generalizes the func-
tion corresponding to KK-stability. Moreover, contract-order stability cor-
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responds to HM-stability with respect to equation (5) for the case in which
v(x)  v(x0) C for all x 6= x0: with this assumption, ef primarily values ac-
cepting a contract with a high value. Thus, this paper's methodology enables
us to generalize and unify Kamada and Kojima (2015) and Goto, Iwasaki,
Kawasaki, Yasuda, and Yokoo (2014) in a straightforward manner.
The additional generality of our methodology also enables us to accom-
modate other possible societal preferences. For instance, consider a situation
in which the hospitals mostly try to equalize the numbers of assigned doc-
tors across hospitals as in KK-stability, but some special matchings are given
priority. Suppose, for example, a particular hospital h has urgent needs for
pediatricians, so matching pediatricians to h takes priority. Such a case can
be accommodated by equation (5) if v(x) is very small for most contracts,35
but v(x) is suciently large for any x which represents a matching of a
pediatrician to the hospital h.
Another example is a situation in which there is a target capacity for each
hospital that needs to be achieved rst, but beyond the target capacities,
applications are accepted according to a common preference ordering H .
This criterion can be expressed by equation (5) by setting vh(j)  v(x)
for any h; x, and j as long as j is at most the target capacity for h, while
vh(j) v(x) for any j that is strictly larger than the target capacity.
Both of these cases can be expressed by equation (5), and the function
f = bf+ ef is M\-concave by the preceding argument. Therefore the generalized
DA mechanism is strategyproof for doctors and produces the doctor-optimal
HM-stable matching. Beyond these specic examples, the major advantage
of our methodology is to provide the policy maker with a general and exible
method to set a policy goal and immediately verify if such a goal is achievable
and, if achievable, provide an o-the-shelf mechanism that produces a desired
outcome.
35More formally, vhi(j) = C(C   jHj  j   i); C  v(x) as in the case of KK-stability.
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